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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCE OF ART *
BRIAN SOUCEK **
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker’s lead argument to the Supreme Court
was that his cakes were artworks, so antidiscrimination laws could not apply.
Across the country, vendors who refuse to provide services for same-sex weddings
continue making similar arguments on behalf of their floral arrangements,
videos, calligraphy, and graphic design, and the Supreme Court will again be
asked to consider their claims.
But arguments like these—what we might call “artistic exemption claims,” akin
to the religious exemptions so much more widely discussed—are actually made
throughout the law, not just in public accommodations cases like Masterpiece
Cakeshop. In areas ranging from tax and tort, employment and contracting
discrimination, to trademark, land use, and criminal law, litigants argue that
otherwise generally applicable laws simply do not apply to artists or their
artworks. This Article collects these artistic exemption claims together for the
first time in order to examine what determines their occasional success—and to
ask when and whether they should succeed.
The surprising answer is that claims of the form “x is protected because it is art”
should never succeed. The category “art” is constitutionally irrelevant. Contrary
to widespread assertion among scholars and advocates, a work’s status as art has
never done any work in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law.
* © 2021 Brian Soucek.
** Professor of Law and Chancellor’s Fellow, University of California, Davis School of Law. To
tackle a topic this broad is to rely on a wide circle of experts and friends. I have learned especially from
exchanges with Jonathan Neufeld, Amy Adler, BJ Ard, Ash Bhagwat, Alan Brownstein, Alan Chen,
Jessica Clarke, Anthony Cross, Ryan Davis, Andrew Gilden, Lydia Goehr, Tristin Green, James
Grimmelmann, David Horton, Matt Lane, Carlton Larson, Dominic McIver Lopes, Sina Najafi, Chris
Odinet, Liesl Olson, Robert Post, Russell Robinson, Betsy Rosenblatt, Jennifer Rothman, Roger
Shiner, Jessica Silbey, Mark Tushnet, Robin West, Felix Wu, and audiences at the ACS Junior Public
Scholars Workshop, the American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, the 2020 Art Law Worksin-Progress Colloquium organized by Peter Karol and Guy Rub, the Art & Law Program in New York
City, the British Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference, the College of Charleston, the Loyola
Constitutional Law Colloquium, Willamette University College of Law, and the Yale Freedom of
Expression Scholars Conference (twice). I am also thankful to my research assistants—Heather Bates,
Jon Morgan Florentino, Jane Martin, Reema Pangarkar, Kelsey Santamaria, and Nicolas Sweeney; to
Dean Kevin Johnson and the UC Davis School of Law for supporting this project through the Martin
Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Fund; to the American Society for Aesthetics for funding my
participation in the faculty seminar “Beauty and Why It Matters” at the University of British
Columbia; and to James Weldon Whalen and the North Carolina Law Review for some of the best
editing my writing has ever received.

99 N.C. L. REV. 685 (2021)

686

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

Instead, the Supreme Court emphasizes individual mediums of expression—
categories like paintings and protest marches, books and billboards. Compared
to the category “art,” these mediums of expression are better defined, easier to
administer, and more relevant to that which the law most likely and legitimately
wants to regulate. Yet they have gotten far less attention from scholars and lower
courts than they deserve.
Understanding the constitutional irrelevance of art—and the constitutional
importance of mediums—casts new light on some of the most prominent recent
and looming artistic exemption claims at the Supreme Court: not just those made
in same-sex wedding cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop and its kin but also
those made in challenges to race discrimination in television and in criminal
threat prosecutions brought against rappers. Asking whether a cake, a TV show,
or a rap song is art uselessly distracts from the difficult issues actually at stake in
those important cases and in First Amendment doctrine more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
The artist Arne Svenson secretly photographed his neighbors through
their apartment windows in Manhattan and sold the pictures in a nearby
gallery. 1 Under New York privacy law, using someone’s likeness for commercial
purposes without their permission is illegal. 2 But when his neighbors sued,
Svenson successfully argued that the law did not apply because the images
Svenson sold were works of art. 3
Elsewhere in New York City, artists wanted to sell their paintings,
sculptures, prints, and photographs on city streets. 4 Street vendors normally
need a permit, but the artists claimed that this would unconstitutionally restrict
their artistic expression. 5 They won. 6 A decade later, graffiti artists selling
spray-painted hats and shirts made the same claim. 7 They lost. 8
A town in Texas banned junked vehicles in people’s yards. 9 A businessman
there claimed that the inoperable Oldsmobile in front of his store—filled with
plants and painted with local scenes—was a work of art, not a junked car, so the
ordinance shouldn’t apply. 10
The Bachelor television franchise was sued for race discrimination after it
failed to cast a single Black bachelor or bachelorette in its first twenty-four
seasons. 11 The case was dismissed at the pleading stage because it threatened to
affect the creative content of an “artistic form[] of expression.” 12
After being arrested on drug and weapon charges, a teenager in
Pennsylvania described online how he was going to maim and kill the police
officers who arrested him. 13 Courts were asked to decide whether the teen could
avoid additional charges of terroristic threats and witness intimidation because
he said what he did within a rap song. 14
Cook County, Illinois, exempts small theaters from paying sales tax on
tickets to live musical performances. 15 Yet it imposed the tax on venues where
1. Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
2. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (Westlaw through L.2021, ch. 1 to 49, 61 to 68).
3. Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 159.
4. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1996).
5. Id. at 698.
6. Id.
7. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2006).
8. Id.
9. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2010).
10. Id. at 324–36.
11. Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
12. Id. at 988.
13. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1148–49 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox v.
Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
14. Id. at 1152–53.
15. COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 74-391 to -92 (LEXIS 2015 Cook County
Ill. Mun. Code Archive).
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DJs, rappers, country singers, and rock bands performed. 16 Musical
performances like these, the county said, were not “commonly regarded as part
of the fine arts.” 17 The venues refused to pay, arguing that the tax officials
should not get to decide what is art—even as they fought for tax exemptions
available only to the arts. 18
*

*

*

Cases like these—which this Article brings together for the first time—
raise what we might call “artistic exemption claims”: arguments that an
otherwise generally applicable law should not apply to someone or something
because that someone is an artist or that something is art.
Artistic exemption claims resemble the religious exemption claims
discussed in so many recent cases, newspapers, and law review articles. From
anti-vaxxers 19 to adoption agencies, 20 Hobby Lobby 21 to Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 22 religious exemptions generate ever more legal controversy and
16. Id. (limiting the exemption to the “fine arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama, comedy,
ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings”).
17. Id. Cook County has since amended its ordinance to remove “fine” from the term “fine arts.”
COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 74-391 to -92 (LEXIS through Ordinance No. 204356, enacted October 22, 2020).
18. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, Cook Cnty. Dep’t of Revenue v. Wladyslaw Kowynia,
Inc., No. D15050079 (Cook Cnty. Dep’t of Admin. Hearings Mar. 31, 2017) (settled).
19. See, e.g., Lauren Sausser, Parenting: Religious Exemptions to Child Vaccine Requirements Keep
Rising in South Carolina, POST & COURIER (June 17, 2018), https://www.postandcourier.com/
columnists/parenting-religious-exemptions-to-child-vaccine-requirements-keep-rising-in/article_6450
8ab6-6d9e-11e8-b351-3b711fcbe895.html [https://perma.cc/GGD2-KE8F]; cf. ALA. CODE § 16-30-3
(Westlaw through Act 2020-206) (providing a religious exemption from Alabama’s vaccination
requirement).
20. See, e.g., H.B. 837, 111th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2020) (providing that no private
child-placing agency shall be required to make placements that violate their religious or moral
convictions); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104
(2020) (mem.).
21. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014) (granting closely held
corporate employers a religious exemption from having to include birth control coverage in their
employee health insurance plans).
22. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). In Masterpiece
Cakeshop, a Christian cake “artist” sought an exemption from Colorado’s public accommodations law
on both religious and artistic grounds. Id. at 1723; id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (examining the artistic exemption claim made by the cake “artist”). Being
required to create cakes for same-sex weddings, the baker said, not only would violate his religious
beliefs but would also amount to government-compelled art making. See Jack Phillips, Can I Just Be a
Cake Artist Again?, DENVER POST (Mar. 8, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/03/
08/jack-phillips-can-i-just-be-a-cake-artist-again/ [https://perma.cc/V847-KDNG]. All but two
Justices dodged the artistic exemption claim when Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided in 2018, but the
Court has already been asked to consider such claims again. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
i, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 19-333 (Sept. 11, 2019) (asking whether the Washington
state antidiscrimination law can require a “Christian artist who imagines, designs, and creates floral
art” to “create custom art that celebrates sacred ceremonies that violate her faith”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 685 (2021)

2021]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCE OF ART

689

scholarly discussion. But similarly widespread and important exemption claims
brought on behalf of art and artists have gotten little attention at all.
As the examples at the start already suggest, artistic exemption claims
range widely across the law, from tax and tort to land use, antidiscrimination,
and criminal law. Some have been successful, while others have not. But no one
has yet given an account of what determines their success or whether or when
they deserve to succeed. And more fundamentally, no one has previously
questioned whether the umbrella term “art” picks out an appropriate—or even
definable—category of things meriting protection. No one has paused to ask
whether the concept of art should be doing any constitutional work.
To ask this is decidedly not to ask whether individual works of art should
receive constitutional protection. The question here is not whether Joni
Mitchell’s songs, Ernest Hemingway’s The Snows of Kilimanjaro, or Kehinde
Wiley’s portrait of President Obama are covered under the First Amendment.
Each of these works clearly is covered, though scholars have sometimes
struggled to explain why. 23 The question here is whether works like these are
covered because they are art.
The answer to that question is no. Scholars assume, litigants argue, and
lower courts have at times accepted the idea that “art” picks out a
constitutionally relevant set of objects and activities deserving of special
protection under the First Amendment. 24 But the U.S. Supreme Court has
never done so. And nor should it—or so this Article claims. For there are
alternative concepts at hand which, while hardly perfect, are easier to define
and more relevant to the task: the mediums of expression that run throughout the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law.
Mediums of expression like music, dance, film, books, paintings, and
sculpture have long received special treatment—as, more recently, have newer
23. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH BEYOND
WORDS 70 (2017) (“Every approach one might take to explaining why the First Amendment covers art
. . . generates odd anomalies.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1971) (“[A] thoughtful judge is likely to ask how an artistic judgment that is wholly
idiosyncratic can be capable of supporting an objection to the law. The objection, ‘I like it,’ is
sufficiently rebutted by ‘we don’t.’” (quoting Walter Berns, Pornography vs. Democracy: The Case for
Censorship, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1971, at 23)); Marci Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73,
108–09 (1996) (“Theories of art’s first amendment content undeniably provide protection to a degree.
By basing art’s protection on its discursive content, however, these theories compel the courts to find
such content in every work of art and force them to struggle with artworks whose communicative
essence is nondiscursive and nonrational.”); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257 (“Literature and the arts must be protected by the First Amendment.
They lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the values out of which
the riches of the general welfare are created.”); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic
Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 223 (“Although
several [theorists] appear to assume that the first amendment protects some forms of artistic expression,
they provide no meaningful analysis of why this should be so.”).
24. See infra Part I and Sections III.A.2–3.
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mediums like video games. But this is not because they are art. Non-artistic
mediums like billboards, yard signs, and leaflets also receive protection, as do
books, movies, and video games, even when they are not works of art. (This
Article would be no more protected if it were written in verse and accepted as
art.)
Conversely, and more controversially, not every work of art merits First
Amendment coverage. Attempts to establish amateur rap or Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s cakes as art are therefore misplaced. The concept of art as an
umbrella term covering all the arts is not just ill-defined. The best definitions
of art on offer simply fail to explain why the set of objects and activities they
identify should all receive special treatment under the law. The concept of art
thus deserves to be constitutionally irrelevant. 25 Arguments claiming that
something should be exempt from an otherwise applicable law because it is an
artwork are therefore unsound.
Part I of this Article canvasses the previously unacknowledged variety of
ways and contexts in which these arguments are made. These contexts are
hardly marginal. In recent years, fights over artistic exemptions have affected
what can be trademarked, what threats can result in prison time, what access
LGBTQ couples have to the marketplace, and what entertainment venues get
taxed in cities and states throughout the country. It is no exaggeration to say
that art exemption claims have reshaped the streetscape of New York City and
the racial demographics of our movies, television shows, and plays.
Some artistic exemption claims arise in court; others are carved out by
legislatures. Some claims depend on definitional arguments: that an object isn’t
governed by a particular law because it is an artwork rather than the kind of
thing (for example a junked car or true threat) the law purports to regulate.
Others call for a balancing of values: they acknowledge that the law applies but
argue that art’s value outweighs whatever values the law was meant to advance.
Part I develops these distinctions before blurring them—showing how
definitional considerations and value-based balancing ultimately intertwine.
They come together in courts’ longstanding concern with mediums of expression.
That is to say, the crucial question in most art exemption cases turns out to be
neither a definitional one—“Is it art?”—or an evaluative one—“Is it good art?”
The crucial question usually does not concern art at all. Instead, artistic
exemption cases more often turn on the nature, value, and definitional limits of

25. Again, this is not to make artworks themselves strangers to the Constitution. As a unanimous
Supreme Court noted, the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky
verse of Lewis Carroll” is “unquestionably shielded.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual
Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). But they aren’t shielded because they are works of art. The
category “art” is not what triggers their protection.
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the medium of expression to which an object is said to belong. 26 Artistic
exemption claims, when they succeed, do so because they are made on behalf of
some member of a recognized medium—painting, for example, or sculpture or
music—not simply because some object can be labeled a work of art.
Part II pursues this insight, making the philosophical case why courts are
correct to focus on individual mediums of expression rather than a more
sweeping concept like art. The argument goes beyond the standard claim that
art is hard to define. The problem is not just that philosophers don’t agree on a
definition—it’s that the definitions on offer are all legally irrelevant. They do
nothing to explain why a set of things so defined should be treated differently
by the law than any other sorts of things. Those claiming art exemptions don’t
just need a definition of art, they need a definition that justifies putting art
beyond law’s reach.
By contrast, mediums of expression—which can be generally artistic (like
music), non-artistic (like billboards or leaflets), or mixed (like books and
photographs)—have boundaries that may be shifting or blurred but are still far
sharper than that of art. (We might debate whether a cake from Masterpiece
Cakeshop is an artwork or not, but it certainly isn’t an opera or photograph.)
Unlike art in the broad sense—the sense generally used by those making artistic
exemption claims—mediums of expression tend to have practitioners and
experts who can help establish the necessary boundaries. And most importantly,
mediums of expression are distinguished in part by their materiality—the very
thing law is most likely and legitimately interested in regulating. Theater,
novels, architecture, and poetry all present different potential harms—harms
the law may well want to address—but exemptions for “art” would end up
lumping them together. Whereas mediums of expression do real constitutional
work, determining whether something is art is just a distraction.
Part III shows how this insight allows us to see the Supreme Court’s free
speech cases in importantly new ways. While scholars and litigants have often
treated arthood as a trigger for First Amendment coverage, the Supreme Court
never has. And going forward, avoiding talk of art would transform free speech
arguments currently pending or looming before the Supreme Court: collisions
between wedding vendors and LGBTQ rights, 27 race-based decision-making in
26. Cf. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression
. . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its
own problems.”).
27. The Court dodged this issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). But discrimination claims have persisted even against
the petitioner in that case. Sam Brasch, Masterpiece Baker Jack Phillips Is Up Against Yet Another Legal
Complaint, COLO. PUB. RADIO (June 6, 2019), https://www.cpr.org/2019/06/06/masterpiece-bakerjack-phillips-is-up-against-yet-another-legal-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/3XXD-RPXY] (describing
the second and third complaints filed against Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop). And other conflicts
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the television and theater industries, 28 and the criminalization of threats made
in rap songs. 29 Some of the issues in these cases may be genuinely hard, but
they are made a lot harder by those who think the concept of art has anything
to do with them.
In all their varied forms and contexts, artistic exemption claims have one
thing in common: they treat art as something that should be above the law. This
Article argues that, within constitutional law, the concept of art should instead
be irrelevant.
I. ARTISTIC EXEMPTION CLAIMS
To claim an artistic exemption is to demand that some generally applicable
law should not apply to a person, object, or activity because the person is an
artist, or the object or activity is art.
Importantly, “art” is used in this Article in its broad sense, as an umbrella
term uniting all artistic activity, not just its narrower meaning covering only
visual art. Here, art includes more than what is studied in an art history
department or collected in an art museum. When philosophers of art ask the
age-old question “What is art?,” they are seeking a definition that covers poetry
and music no less than painting and sculpture. (Whether they succeed is another
question and one we will return to in Part II.) When we praise someone as “a
real artist” or call up the cliché of the “struggling artist,” we are as likely to be
talking about a songwriter, novelist, or dancer as a painter or photographer.
Googling “a true artist” may summon results about nail salon owners and dog
groomers alongside articles about people who draw or paint. Tattoo “artists”

between wedding vendors and same-sex couples have continued percolating throughout state and
federal courts across the country. See, e.g., Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 747–48 (8th
Cir. 2019); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 746 Fed. App’x 709, 711–12 (10th Cir. 2018); Brush & Nib
Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 895 (Ariz. 2018); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441
P.3d 1203, 1209 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-333 (Sept. 11, 2019).
28. Although the Supreme Court decided one case about race discrimination in cable television
during its 2019 Term, see Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009,
1013 (2020), the Court sidestepped a related case which asked “[w]hether a cable operator has a First
Amendment right to include racial considerations among the factors it evaluates in making editorial
determinations as to what programming to carry on its limited bandwidth,” Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i–ii, Charter Commc’ns. v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 2561 (2019)
(mem.) (No. 18-1185). Paul Clement’s petition in that case raised the specter of the musical Hamilton
having to hire a White actor as George Washington. Id. at 26. (Throughout this Article, “White” and
“Black” are capitalized, both in keeping with North Carolina Law Review style guidance and for reasons
well-described by Nell Irvin Painter, Why ‘White’ Should Be Capitalized, Too, WASH. POST (July 22,
2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/22/why-white-should-becapitalized/ [https://perma.cc/6Z6V-2BSB (dark archive)].)
29. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,
Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct.
1547 (2019) (No. 18-949) [hereinafter Knox, Certiorari Petition].
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figure prominently in the results as well. 30 In part, this is because art is not just
a category but also an honorific. The fact that belonging to the category is often
seen as a form of praise only makes the definitional boundaries harder to
maintain.
The struggle to maintain boundaries around the concept of art is a
dominant theme in the pages to come. But to be clear, the boundaries that
matter are those that cabin art in its widest sense, for this is the sense in which
litigants invoke art in the examples that follow. 31 The artistic exemption claims
canvased in this part are made not just for photography, paintings, and film, but
also for music, dance, and theater—and, as we will see, for wedding cakes,
junked cars, and potentially endless other types of installations, performances,
and happenings. Claims on behalf of “art,” thus broadly defined, pervade the
law, in areas ranging from land use and intellectual property to
antidiscrimination, criminal, and tax law. The sections that follow take these
areas in turn.
These discussions are grouped, however, into what at first seem like two
different modes of argument—two different types of claims.

30. See, e.g., True Artists – Association of Certified Tattoo Artists (@TrueArtists), FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/TrueArtists/ [https://perma.cc/WED5-ZYXJ] (describing tattoo artists as
“True Artists”); Tigra Lorusso, Nail Art, PINTEREST, https://www.pinterest.de/pin/
382172718351582112/ [https://perma.cc/E2RV-DD3J] (describing a nail design as “AMAZING!
TRUE ARTIST!”).
31. To say this is not to say that courts, scholars, or litigants are always clear about the two
different ways in which “art” is used. Take, for example, the recent case of a wedding photographer
who objected to Louisville’s requirement that she serve customers regardless of their sexual orientation.
See Chelsey Nelson Photography LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 479 F. Supp. 3d 543
(W.D. Ky. 2020) (order granting in part and denying in part preliminary injunction). Judge Walker,
then still presiding over the Western District of Kentucky, found the photographer’s artistic exemption
claim likely to succeed based on a series of “straightforward principles:
• Her photography is art.
• Art is speech.
• The government can’t compel speech . . . .”

Id. at 549 (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit case that the district court cited for its two claims
about art states that the First Amendment covers both words and “other mediums of expression, including
music, pictures, films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, and sculptures.” ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that
the district court’s claim that “[a]rt is speech” is meant to extend to this whole variety of mediums,
including Chelsey Nelson’s photography. Chelsey Nelson Photography, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 549. Elsewhere
in the same district court opinion, however, Judge Walker talked of the First Amendment’s
unquestionable protection of “art, music, and literature.” Id. at 558. There, “art” is used as one medium
among several, not an umbrella term embracing the visual arts and writing and music. Given its
importance in the discussion to come, I emphasize the Sixth Circuit’s explicit reference to “mediums
of expression,” ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 924, over Judge Walker’s broader umbrella term, Chelsey Nelson
Photography, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 558. Those mediums of expression, rather than “art,” are what the Sixth
Circuit claims the First Amendment protects. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 924.
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On one side are categorization claims. These argue that a law regulating x
shouldn’t apply to some object or activity, y, because y is not x; y is art. Thus, a
law banning junked cars should not apply to what is allegedly a sculpture (made
from a junked car) in someone’s yard. Similarly, an alleged threat should not be
seen as criminal because it was actually just a rap lyric. Section I.A considers
claims that take this approach.
On the other side are balancing claims. These acknowledge that an artistic
object or activity is precisely the kind of thing the law covers but insist that the
artwork’s expressive value outweighs whatever value the law intends to
promote. Artists selling their wares on New York City sidewalks or Masterpiece
Cakeshop selling cakes in Colorado both admit they are selling goods that would
otherwise be subject to street vending or public accommodations laws. Their
claim is that their expressive interests are weightier than the government’s
interest in avoiding sidewalk congestion (in the former case) or promoting
equality (in the latter). Section I.B considers these and similar arguments.
Before doing this, though, it is worth pausing to ask where all these artistic
exemption claims come from. And here, it may help to compare artistic
exemptions to the much better-known exemption claims made on behalf of
religion.
Like religious exemptions, artistic exemption claims can be based on either
constitutional protections or statutory carve outs. Constitutional religious
exemption claims come from the Free Exercise Clause—not very effectively
since Employment Division v. Smith, 32 but that may soon change. 33
Constitutional protections for works of art, by contrast, have a less explicit
source. While other countries provide specific constitutional protections for
art, 34 protections in the United States derive from the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause, and justifying them has long been a matter of controversy, given
the sometimes awkward or nonobvious fit between art and the marketplace of
32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
33. See id. at 880–82 (declining to provide constitutional religion-based exemptions to valid and
neutral laws of general applicability). But see Brief for Petitioners at 37–52, Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123) (arguing that Smith should be replaced by a “strict
scrutiny test for laws which infringe upon religious exercise”).
34. See, e.g., Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] [Constitution], art. 5(3), translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html [https://perma.cc/J265-7JJQ] (Ger.)
(“Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free.”); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
173 (Ger.), translation at https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/
case.php?id=1478 [https://perma.cc/7VM5-52V3] (describing the German Basic Law’s “comprehensive
guarantee of the freedom of artistic activity” and characterizing the “essence of artistic endeavor [as
lying in] the free creative process whereby the artist, in his chosen communicative medium, gives
immediate perceptible form to what he has felt, learnt, or experienced”); see also Raman Maroz, The
Freedom of Artistic Expression in the Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany: A Comparative Analysis, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 358–81
(2017) (helpfully summarizing the German Constitutional Court’s case law on art).
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ideas and democratic self-governance—what many see as the main rationales
for protecting speech. 35
Deepening the constitutional difference between art and religion: there is
no artistic equivalent to the Constitution’s Establishment Clause, which limits
the state’s ability to support religion. The fact that the government can, and
does, 36 support the arts in ways it could never support religion may lessen art’s
need, in comparison to religion’s, for constitutional protection from
governmental burdens. 37
For now, however, most exemptions claimed on behalf of religion are
actually not constitutional but rooted in statutory law. The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, 38 for example, provides the possibility of exemptions
from nearly any federal law that substantially burdens a religious practice. 39
There is no across-the-board equivalent for art. What federal, state, and local
governments have done instead, and often, is to write specific artistic carve outs
into particular statutes and regulations. In this, art and religion do prove
analogous. Legislative carve outs for religion are found in hundreds of federal
laws—from food inspection regulations to copyright, asylum, and drug laws, to
Title VII’s protections against employment discrimination. 40 Similarly, the
examples of artistic exemptions canvased throughout this part include a number
of legislated carve outs for various artistic practices.
35. See supra note 23 (collecting explanations for protecting art under the First Amendment).
36. See Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 387–412 (2017) (detailing
ways in which the government subsidizes art in the United States) [hereinafter Soucek, Aesthetic
Judgment].
37. Some scholars have justified religious exemptions as a counterweight to the disadvantageous
treatment of religion under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses
as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause Are Stronger when Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701,
1703–04 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3
(2000). According to these counterweight arguments, the state’s massive support for the arts should
presumably weaken the justification for exempting art from the state’s laws. See CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 51, 59–62
(2007) (discussing why the United States funds and administers a National Endowment for the Arts
but not a National Endowment for Religion); see also McConnell, supra, at 10 (noting that while General
Motors and environmental activists do not get the same exemptions that religious practitioners
sometimes do, General Motors—unlike religious organizations—can get bailed out by the government,
and environmentalism—unlike religious beliefs—can be taught in schools and promoted through
regulations that governmental agencies craft and enforce).
38. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4).
39. §6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)) (“This Act applies
to all Federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after the enactment of this Act”). The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5), requires more targeted exemptions from state laws in the contexts of
prisons and land use.
40. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445–46 (1992).
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Technically, these statutory and regulatory schemes offer artistic
exemptions within the law, not exemptions from the law. But laws like these
remain relevant even to an Article concerned with art’s constitutional status for
a few reasons. First, though artists obviously don’t need to claim an exemption
from a law that already carves out their art, the original drafting of the law itself
may have been a response to artistic exemption claims, including constitutional
ones. 41 Second, when legislative carve outs are underinclusive—failing to
include all that might qualify as art—those whose art is not exempted by the law
will likely bring exemption claims against the law. 42 Third, and relatedly,
legislative carve outs that provide exemptions for certain arts, but not others,
can be challenged as discriminatory. 43 In such cases, legislative exemptions
themselves are said to violate the Constitution’s protection for art. The
following pages provide examples of all of this and more.
A.

Categorization Claims
1. Land Use

Since 1990, Michael Kleinman has celebrated the opening of each of his
novelty and gift stores with a charity “car bash.” 44 Donors pay to smash a car
with a sledgehammer, and after, the smashed car gets filled with dirt and plants,
painted over by local artists, and displayed in front of the store. 45 In November
2007, this occurred in San Marcos, Texas. 46 The victim: an Oldsmobile 88. 47
Unfortunately for Kleinman, San Marcos has a junked vehicle ordinance
which says that inoperable vehicles that are wrecked or dismantled, lacking a
license plate or inspection sticker, and visible from the street are treated as a
public nuisance, subject to seizure and demolition. 48 After a complaint was filed
about a “nasty looking old vehicle” on the north side of the I-35, the city issued

41. See infra Section I.B.2 (discussing the New York City Council’s carve out for books and other
printed material in its 1982 permit requirements for street vendors).
42. See infra Section I.A.3 (discussing claims by music clubs not granted a county tax exemption
for admission revenue from “live performance[s] in any of the disciplines which are commonly regarded
as part of the fine arts”).
43. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695–96 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering but not
deciding whether an ordinance that distinguishes between written and visual artistic expression
discriminates on the basis of content); Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 465–66 (discussing
difficulties distinguishing content, viewpoint, speaker, and medium discrimination in regard to art).
44. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 2010); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 28, Kleinman, 597 F.3d 323 (No. 08-50960) [hereinafter Kleinman, Certiorari Petition].
45. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 324.
46. Id.
47. Id.; Kleinman, Certiorari Petition, supra note 44, at 59.
48. SAN MARCOS, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 34.191, 34.194, 34.200, 34.201(a) (LEXIS
through Ordinance No. 2020-44, enacted June 16, 2020).
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a citation, and a local court found that the object in front of Kleinman’s store
qualified as a junked vehicle under San Marcos’s definition. 49
Kleinman’s counterargument was that the object in dispute was “no longer
a vehicle of any kind, but ha[d] been fully recycled and transformed into a
planter, and a work of art.” 50 The transformation, in fact, was the very point of
the artwork. 51 As Kleinman described his project: “I am trying to make a
philosophical statement about the need to find ways to combat the pollution
caused by automobiles, by finding ways to recycle and reprocess them, and this
method does that, by showing how we can turn them into a beautiful work of
art.” 52 The car-planter artwork, in other words, exemplified the meaning that it
was meant to convey. 53 As the communication studies professor who served as
Kleinman’s expert witness explained, “[T]he use of a junked car as an artistic
and communicative medium . . . is a central part of the message that is
communicated by the art object.” 54 In other words, “[T]he medium is the
message.” 55
Kleinman lost this argument. 56 Holding that the object on his lawn fit the
definition of a junked vehicle, the court realized at least implicitly that the law
cannot remain blind to the material out of which artworks are made. 57 At best,
the law can treat the regulated entity as both artwork and a mere thing—in this
case, a junked car—at once.
Here, however, Kleinman had a backup argument. 58 In federal court, his
claim was not that the local ordinance didn’t apply; rather, the ordinance, at
least as applied to his junked-car art, was unconstitutional content
discrimination. 59 Since the medium was part of the message, regulation of the
medium—junked cars—in his case interfered with the message he wanted to
49. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 324–25; Brief of Appellants at 9, Kleinman, 597 F.3d 323 (No. 0850960).
50. Kleinman Affidavit, Record on Appeal at 47, Kleinman, 597 F.3d 323 (No. 08-50960).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 46.
53. Artworks that exemplify their meaning are ones that show, not (just) tell. More formally, they
symbolically refer to properties which they themselves possess. Like samples or swatches, they call
attention to (some of) their own properties. For a non-artistic example of this, compare the word
“polysyllabic,” which exemplifies its meaning, with “monosyllabic,” which does not. For deep and at
times amusing discussions of exemplification, see NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART 52–67
(1976), and NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 32–37, 63–65 (1978).
54. Expert Report of Robert M. Bednar, Ph. D. at 2, Kleinman, 597 F.3d 323 (No. 08-50960).
55. Id. (quoting MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN 7 (1964)).
56. See Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 325.
57. Id. See generally ARTHUR C. DANTO, THE TRANSFIGURATION OF THE COMMONPLACE: A
PHILOSOPHY OF ART 1–32 (1981) (discussing the difference between “Works of Art and Mere Real
Things”).
58. See Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 326.
59. Id.
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convey. 60 But this argument too depended on a recategorization. Only by
treating the regulated object as an artwork could medium and message merge
in this way, such that regulating the former unconstitutionally abridged the
latter.
In an unsympathetic 2010 opinion, 61 the Fifth Circuit rejected this move
in Kleinman v. City of San Marcos. 62 It noted that the Supreme Court had
referred to the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schönberg, or
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll” as “unquestionably shielded.” 63 But this
passage, it said, “refers solely to great works of art,” leaving open the question
of whether lesser works should get protection at all. 64 The expressive quality of
Kleinman’s less exalted work was secondary to its function and utility, and thus
regulations on its display were only subjected to rational basis review. 65 Then,
arguing in the alternative and acknowledging the possible expressive character
of the work, the court applied the test established in United States v. O’Brien 66
for laws that incidentally burden expression. 67 The O’Brien test asks whether a
law furthers an important interest unrelated to expression, and whether it does
so without incidentally burdening expression more than necessary to further the
government’s interest. 68 Finding no governmental intent to discriminate and
plenty of alternative modes of expression available, 69 the Fifth Circuit denied
Kleinman his art exemption. The Supreme Court refused to take the case. 70
As we will repeatedly see in the examples to come, the First Amendment
has particular difficulty dealing with claims like Kleinman’s: claims of
exemplified meaning. Let’s say someone thought that the court system in this
country was illegitimate and should be burned to the ground. One especially
powerful way of communicating that message would be to literally burn a
courthouse to the ground, and yet no court would recognize a First Amendment
defense in that case. 71 The problem is this: nearly any action can be understood
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. 597 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2010).
63. Id. at 326 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 327 (claiming this holding could be made “without recourse to principles of aesthetics”
(quoting Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2006))); see also infra Section
I.B.2.
66. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
67. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 328.
68. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. For more on O’Brien, see infra notes 189–91.
69. See Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 328–29 (noting that Kleinman could display the work out of sight
from the road or could display images of the work to those driving by).
70. 562 U.S. 837 (2010).
71. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 772 (2001) (imagining
a driver, arrested for speeding, who claims that driving fast was his way of “‘expressing disagreement’
with the federally mandated speed limit . . . [or] was ‘performance art’”).
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as expressing endorsement of that very action. But that cannot bring every
action within the protective coverage of the Free Speech Clause. 72 And in a
world where anything can be an artwork, 73 the First Amendment could
potentially be invoked against any regulation at all. 74
This is the dynamic, and the worry, that was at play in Kleinman, where
the defense’s main argument was a metaphysical one: this object is a work of
art, not a junked car. It is easy to understand why the city issued a citation
nonetheless. As the philosopher Arthur Danto once wrote: “To mistake an
artwork for a real object is no great feat when an artwork is the real object one
mistakes it for.” 75
2. Threats and Lies
Although Kleinman never got to the Supreme Court, another categorical
art exemption claim did. It arose in a criminal threat case, Elonis v. United
States. 76 The Court dodged the First Amendment issue there, though, 77 and in
2019 it did so again by denying certiorari in a similar case, Commonwealth v.
Knox. 78
Elonis and Knox both involved prosecutions against men accused of making
threats in rap songs. Under his Facebook persona, Tone Dougie, Anthony
Douglas Elonis posted rap lyrics describing violent acts against his ex-wife, local
elementary schools, and an FBI agent. 79 He was sentenced to three years and
eight months for making threats in interstate commerce. 80 Jamal Knox is a
rapper whose work is commercially available under his stage name, Mayhem

72. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea.”).
73. See, e.g., ARTHUR C. DANTO, WHAT ART IS 26 (2013) [hereinafter DANTO, WHAT ART IS]
(“[J]ust because anything can be art, it doesn’t follow that everything is art.”); Amy M. Adler, The Folly
of Defining Art, in THE NEW GATEKEEPERS: EMERGING CHALLENGES TO FREE EXPRESSION IN
THE ARTS 90, 90 (Christopher Hawthorne & András Szántó eds., 2003).
74. Outside the context of art, a bourgeoning literature has arisen on what some see as the
opportunistic expansiveness of recent First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer,
First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174,
175 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The
Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
491, 491 (2013); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1200
(2015); Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 318 (2018); Amanda
Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133 (2016).
75. Arthur Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. PHIL. 571, 575 (1964).
76. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
77. Id. at 2013.
78. 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
79. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
80. Id.
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Mal. 81 After being arrested on drug and weapon charges, Knox posted a song
online that described violence against the police officers who arrested him. 82
Charged with making terroristic threats and with witness intimidation, Knox
was convicted and sentenced to a one-to-three year term. 83
Elonis and Knox both asked what it takes for a statement to count as a “true
threat,” unprotected by the First Amendment. Courts are split: some look to
subjective intent while others consider whether a reasonable person would hear
in the speech an intent to cause harm. 84 This isn’t a question limited to the arts,
of course. Elonis himself was charged not just for his threatening rap lyrics but
also for a comedy routine that he posted online. 85 But both Elonis and Knox
emphasized the artistic nature of their speech. 86 The petition for writ of
certiorari in Knox, for example, claimed that the case was “of great concern to
the music industry,” especially now, given that “many artists have directed
virulent speech specifically toward the President.” 87 Amicus briefs by music
scholars and performers, including Killer Mike and Chance the Rapper, were
filed in Knox’s support. 88 And while the Supreme Court has left the issue open,
addressing the intent requirement for criminal threats but not the claimed
artistic exemptions, cases involving threats made within various genres of
music 89 and other arts 90 have popped up across the country.
81. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 3; see also ERIK NIELSON & ANDREA L. DENNIS,
RAP ON TRIAL: RACE, LYRICS AND GUILT IN AMERICA 101–02, 106–11 (2019) (discussing Knox’s
prosecution and appeal in the context of rap’s broader reception in American courts).
82. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 4.
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
86. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 19 (“Imprisoning a person for a statement that is
not only objectively nonthreatening but in fact artistically or socially valuable is fundamentally
inconsistent with the First Amendment and would erode the breathing space that safeguards the free
exchange of ideas.”); see Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006 (“Art is about pushing limits. I’m willing to go to
jail for my Constitutional rights. Are you?”).
87. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 23–24.
88. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Michael Render
(“Killer Mike”) et al. in Support of Petitioner, Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2019), cert.
denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 1115837
[hereinafter Knox, Brief of Render]; Motion for Leave to File and Brief for Amici Curiae Art Scholars
and Historians in Support of Petitioner, Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (No. 19-949) [hereinafter Knox, Brief for
Art Scholars].
89. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1146.
90. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
student’s sketch depicting violent siege on the school was protected speech); Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d
824, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that painted words on rear of van did not constitute true threats
outside the scope of protection of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee); LeVine v. Blaine
Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that student’s poem implying a threat to himself
and other students was not protected speech); In re George T., 93 P.3d 1007, 1009 (Cal. 2004) (holding
that a violent poem disseminated by a juvenile was not a threat); In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193,
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The artistic exemption claims made in these cases can again be framed as
miscategorization claims, much like Kleinman’s. In short: this is a rap lyric, not
a threat. Like Kleinman, who thought an artwork had been misidentified as a
junked car, the artist-defendants in the true threat cases also claimed that their
speech had been put in the wrong categorical box.
To that end, Knox’s petition for writ of certiorari argued that “reasonable
listeners understand that violent lyrics in music are not literal.” 91 His art scholar
amici went further:
[A] work of art is not the same thing as the messages it conveys or the
feelings it arouses. A painting, poem, sculpture, or song may be
consistent with reality, but that does not mean that it is reality. . . . Art
does not manifest in the real; the thought-message of an artwork is
experienced—sensed, felt, processed—not stated. See Archibald
MacLeish, “Ars Poetica” (1926), (“A poem should not mean/But be.”). 92
The scholars draw a line here between musical lyrics and ordinary, literal
expression—between art and reality. The prosecutors and jury erred in Knox’s
case, they argue, by confusing the former for the latter.
It is not entirely clear how art’s failure to manifest in the real coheres with
the art scholars’ discussions of art therapy and catharsis, both of which turn on
art’s efficacy in altering the presumably real emotions of those who experience
it. 93 The categorical claim turns on the not fully coherent idea that art is
metaphysically separate from the world of everyday threats.
A similar categorical exemption claim can be found in cases involving
constitutional protection for lies and exaggerations. Before it was struck down
in 2012, the Stolen Valor Act 94 made it a crime to claim falsely that one had
been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. 95 “The Act by its plain terms
applies to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to any person,”
Justice Kennedy wrote for a four-member plurality 96 in United States v.
195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a painting depicting a minor shooting a high school police
officer was not a threat).
91. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 25.
92. Knox, Brief for Art Scholars, supra note 88, at 8 (citations omitted or shortened); see also id. at
12 (“[T]he fact that rap roots itself firmly in the real does not make it any less representational (or any
more real) than other forms of violent artistic expression that are entitled to First Amendment
protection.”).
93. Nor is it clear how the modernism typified by the authority the scholars cite, Archibald
MacLeish’s “Ars Poetica,” is consistent with the politically engaged conception of hip-hop and rap that
the amicus brief goes on to describe. For a reevaluation of MacLeish as a politically engaged poet whose
later work stands opposed to the high modernism of his more famous poems like “Ars Poetica,” see
John Timberman Newcomb, Archibald MacLeish and the Poetics of Public Speech: A Critique of High
Modernism, 23 J. MIDWEST MOD. LANGUAGE ASS’N 9, 9 (1990).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1).
95. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012).
96. Id. at 722.
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Alvarez. 97 Even so, he added one crucial qualification: “It can be assumed that
[the Act] would not apply to, say, a theatrical performance.” 98
The theater exemption Justice Kennedy read into the Stolen Valor Act is
nowhere in the text. So how is it justified? Are statements made in theater not
falsehoods, since they are true within the world of the play? Perhaps the
categorical claim is that the Stolen Valor Act criminalized liars, not actors.
It would be much too strong, however, to say that statements cannot be
lies—or for that matter, threats—because they occur within a play. Consider
Hamlet. 99 Not only are lies told within the world of that play, 100 but Hamlet’s
plot turns on the fact that a play can be used to cause real effects—even make
threats!—within the non-make-believe world. Though Hamlet himself says that
the players in his staging of The Murder of Gonzago “do but jest, poison in jest;
no offense i’ the world,” the very point of the staging is to cause offense and
fear in Hamlet and Claudius’s world, not that of Gonzago onstage. 101 King
Claudius should feel no less threatened by the fact that he’s merely watching
theater.
In Alvarez, Justice Kennedy suggests a different argument for why lies
about congressional medals in plays might be treated differently. Instead of
relying on metaphysical claims about theater, or art more generally, Kennedy
refers to a line of defamation and emotional distress cases 102 where the Court
found that the hyperbolic or parodic statements at issue could not “reasonably
be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.” 103 Key here is the
notion of “interpretation.” Knowing we are in a theater is less a metaphysical
insight than it is an interpretive fact. It is one of many context clues, none
necessarily dispositive, that may lead us to interpret a statement as literal,
deceptive, or threatening—or not.
A similar question of interpretation emerges when we turn back to the rap
cases. The artistic medium (music) and the genre (rap) that were employed by
Elonis, Knox, and others can be seen as interpretively relevant, even if not
metaphysically so. That is to say, the fact that some statement was made within
a rap song is surely relevant in determining whether the statement was meant
to be, or is properly understood as, threatening. But this is far different than
97. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
98. Id.
99. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET (Edward Dowden ed., London, Methuen & Co. 1899).
100. As Hamlet accuses the grave-digging clown in Act V: “Thou dost lie in’t, to be in’t and say it
is thine; ‘tis for the dead, not for the quick; therefore thou liest.” Id. at act V, sc. 1.
101. See id. at act III, sc. 2.
102. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)). The
Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), in turn, cites Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988), National Ass’n Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284–86 (1974),
and Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). Mikovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
103. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20).
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saying, as amici did, that rap lyrics are metaphysically incapable of
communicating true threats. Arguing that a statement “was (just) rap” is
perhaps best seen not as a categorical defense but rather as a weight put on the
interpretive scale. I return to this point in Part III. 104
For now, it is important to note that even in regard to interpretation,
identifying a rap song or play as art plays no role. What matters for deciding
whether something is a threat or lie is the context provided by the conventions
of a given medium, like theater, or of a genre, like rap. As Part II argues, the
category “art” does not itself have its own interpretive conventions. So arthood
does no interpretive work here at all.
3. Taxes
New York state taxes admission fees for “place[s] of amusement” unless
they are a “theatre, opera house, concert hall or other hall or place of assembly
for a live dramatic, choreographic or musical performance.” 105 Nite Moves, a
strip club outside Albany, spent years arguing that the pole and lap dancing it
offers constitute “choreographic . . . performance.” 106 In 2012, New York’s
highest court disagreed, finding that the state’s Tax Appeal Tribunal need not
“extend a tax exemption to every act that declares itself a ‘dance
performance.’” 107 Three judges dissented, accusing the majority of “mak[ing] a
distinction between highbrow dance and lowbrow dance that is not to be found
in the governing statute and raises significant constitutional problems.” 108
“Under New York’s Tax Law,” said the dissenters, “a dance is a dance.” 109
In Chicago, similar city and county taxes applied to amusements other
than “live performance[s] in any of the disciplines which are commonly
regarded as part of the fine arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama,
comedy, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings.” 110 In
2016, county officials went after music venues for hundreds of thousands of
dollars in unpaid taxes, and a hearing officer agreed that “[r]ap music, country
music, and rock ‘n’ roll do not fall under the purview of ‘fine art.’” 111 Eventually,
104. See infra Section III.B.1.
105. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1101(d)(5), 1105(f)(1) (Westlaw through L.2021, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 68).
106. 677 New Loudon Corp. v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 85 A.D.3d 1341, 1341–43 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 1058 (2012).
107. Id.
108. 677 New Loudon Corp. v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 19 N.Y.3d 1058, 1061 (2012) (Smith,
J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1062.
110. COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 74-391 (LEXIS through Ordinance No. 204356, enacted October 22, 2020); id. § 74-392(a); cf. id. § 74-392(d)(1) (offering tax exemptions to
venues that seat 750 or fewer people).
111. Lee V. Gaines, Cook County Doubles Down: Rap, Rock, Country, and DJ Sets Are Not ‘Fine Arts,’
Not Exempt from Amusement Tax, CHI. READER (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/
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the county ended up amending its ordinances to clarify what kinds of DJ sets
qualified for the exemption, but litigation over back taxes continued until the
parties settled. 112 These kinds of taxes, with exemptions that privilege certain
art forms over others, have long been common at the local, state, and even
federal level. 113 The federal cabaret tax—which got as high as thirty percent
during World War II, but didn’t apply to instrumental music in venues without
dancing—likely sped the decline of big band jazz (which was taxed) and the
growth of bebop (which was not). 114
The art exemption claims made in the tax cases are categorization claims:
they turn on the argument that some activity being taxed as entertainment is
really tax-exempt art. These cases are different from those of the preceding
sections, however, in three interesting ways.
First, these claims seek to benefit from an exemption already enshrined in
a statute. The strip club wants the exemption New York City Ballet already
gets; 115 the rock club wants to be treated the same way Chicago treats its classical
recital halls. 116 Here, then, we encounter the first artistic analogue to the many
statutory carve outs that exempt religious believers or organizations from
otherwise applicable legal requirements, from the military draft 117 to Title VII’s
protection against religious discrimination. 118 As in those cases, the statutory
exemption spawns two types of controversies. One is definitional: What is a
religious organization? Or similarly: What counts as a choreographic
performance? The other concerns unconstitutional favoritism: Why let religious
believers but not secular pacifists out of the draft? Why should ballet get a
government benefit pole dancing does not?

Bleader/archives/2016/08/22/cook-county-doubles-down-rap-rock-country-and-dj-sets-are-not-finearts-not-exempt-from-amusement-tax [https://perma.cc/XKE3-DTRT]; Whet Moser, This Is What
Happens when Courts Decide What Is and Isn’t Art, CHI. MAG. (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/August-2016/Cook-County-Fine-Arts/
[https://perma.cc/
SF6E-4XKD].
112. Settlement Agreement Between Cook County and Wladyslaw Kowynia, Inc., Cook Cnty.
Dep’t of Revenue v. Wladyslaw Kowynia, Inc., No. D15050079 (Cook Cty. Dep’t of Admin. Hearings
Mar. 31, 2017) (settled).
113. See, e.g., Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 650 A.2d 147, 152–53
(Conn. 1994) (describing the federal cabaret tax, first imposed during World War I). The tax applied
to “vaudeville or other performance or diversion in the way of acting, singing, declamation or dancing,
either with or without instrumental or other music” but exempted “orchestras performing instrumental
music only.” Id. at 152.
114. Patrick Jarenwattananon, How Taxes and Moving Changed the Sound of Jazz, NPR (Apr. 16,
2013, 4:27 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ablogsupreme/2013/04/16/177486309/how-taxes-andmoving-changed-the-sound-of-jazz?ft=1 [https://perma.cc/JB2F-VZCK].
115. See 677 New Loudon Corp. v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 19 N.Y.3d 1058, 1059 (2012).
116. See Gaines, supra note 111.
117. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
118. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987).
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The former, definitional questions may give rise to some difficult statutory
interpretation problems, but these can all be resolved, at least in theory, by more
precise legislative drafting. West Virginia law, for example, avoids the problem
that arose in New York by explicitly barring “nude or strip show presentations”
from the tax exemption the state offers other “dance presentation[s].” 119 More
intractable is the second constitutional worry that arises when one art form is
treated less favorably than another.
But this is where another difference between these tax cases and the cases
in the preceding subsections comes in. The artistic exemption claims in the
earlier cases were all trying to skirt some government prohibition. Without an
exemption, Kleinman’s junked car got ticketed; Elonis and Knox served prison
sentences for their rap. By contrast, Nite Moves and the bars in Chicago are
not getting shut down; they’re being made to pay the same taxes that venues
presenting ice dancing or the circus also have to pay. At stake in these tax cases,
at least arguably, is something more akin to a government subsidy. 120
The framing here matters from a constitutional standpoint. If Nite Moves
is being penalized by a selective tax, the worries about content discrimination
that arose in the junked car case return in an even more pointed way. 121 If,
however, Nite Moves and the bars in Chicago are just missing out on a subsidy
offered to others, this seems no more constitutionally problematic than
government arts funding itself. 122
There is one final difference: tax cases make explicit the kinds of value
judgments about art that remained largely under the surface in the earlier
subsections. According to the dissenting judges in New York, the strip club was
taxed “because [its] performances are, in the majority’s view, not ‘cultural and
artistic.’” 123 In Chicago, the hearing officer wanted musicologists to come testify
about why “the music [the clubs] are talking about falls within any disciplines
considered fine art.” 124 The definitional or category questions in the tax cases
119. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-15-9(a)(40) (LEXIS through all 2020 Reg. Sess. Legislation).
120. See Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 459–61. In fact, the government “subsidy”
provided to U.S. arts organizations through their tax-exempt status amounts to billions of dollars—as
much or more than the direct support the government provides through grant programs. Id. at 396
n.73.
121. See 677 New Loudon Corp. v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 19 N.Y.3d 1058, 1063 (2012)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (imagining, and finding unconstitutional, a state tax imposed on Hustler
magazine but not The New Yorker); cf. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987)
(striking down Arkansas’s “selective, content-based taxation of certain magazines”).
122. See Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983); see also Brian Soucek, Discriminatory
Paycheck Protection, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 319, 326–30 (2020) (distinguishing selective
government subsidies from discriminatory regulation on speech); Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note
36, at 459–66 (discussing difficulties with this distinction).
123. 677 New Loudon Corp., 19 N.Y.3d at 1062 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1060 (majority
opinion)).
124. Moser, supra note 111.
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were thus being argued at least partially on evaluative grounds. Not just “Is this
dance or music?” but “Is this dance or music good enough for the state to
subsidize?” Perhaps the courts or administrative hearing officers have no
business asking these questions, but insofar as the tax “exemptions” are akin to
subsidies, legislators can surely decide what arts activities are worthy of state
support.
To give a subsidy—a tax exemption—only to art making deemed worthy
requires evaluation and, ultimately, balancing of various governmental
interests. 125 Courts don’t always acknowledge that. They treat evaluation as if it
were classification, categorizing less favored arts as “entertainment” or denying
that the dancing in a strip bar is a “choreographic performance.” 126 We will
return to this point after looking at claims where the balancing is explicit.
B.

Balancing Claims

The above categorization claims argue that a law has been misapplied,
having confused art with something else—junked cars, threats, lies, or mere
entertainment. 127 By contrast, balancing claims acknowledge the applicability of
a law but argue that art’s expressive value trumps whatever value the law aims
to promote, whether that be privacy, personal autonomy, equality, economic
fairness, or sidewalk congestion.
1. Privacy and Trademark
When the photographer Arne Svenson exhibited his project, The
Neighbors, at New York’s Julie Saul Gallery in 2013, his neighbors were incensed
to learn that they were, in fact, the subject of the show. 128 Over the course of a
year, Svenson had taken their photographs from his Tribeca studio with a
telephoto lens aimed at their windowed apartments across the street. 129
New York privacy law prohibits using someone’s “name, portrait, picture
or voice . . . for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without [their]
written consent.” 130 But when Svenson’s neighbors sued him for selling pictures

125. See, e.g., Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 414–16 (discussing a similar balancing of
interests in land use decisions).
126. See supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text.
127. See supra Sections I.A.2–3.
128. Hili Perlson, Voyeuristic Photographer Arne Svenson Wins New York Appellate Court Case,
ARTNET (Apr. 10, 2015), https://news.artnet.com/market/arne-svenson-neighbors-photographssupreme-court-286916 [https://perma.cc/VXU6-74P7].
129. Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 152–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
130. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (Westlaw through L.2021, ch. 1 to 49, 61 to 68). Unlike other
states, New York does not recognize a right to privacy tort based on “unreasonable intrusion upon
seclusion.” See Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 123–24 (1993). It is hard to imagine Svenson
succeeding in his art exemption claim against that tort, were it available.
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of them, they lost. 131 State courts in New York decided that “works of art fall
outside the prohibition of the privacy statute.” 132 Just as courts had previously
exempted “newsworthy events and matters of public concern” from New York’s
privacy statute, the appellate court in Foster v. Svenson 133 found “that the public,
as a whole, has an equally strong interest in the dissemination of images,
aesthetic values and symbols contained in the art work,” as well as “the
informational value of the ideas conveyed by the art work.” 134
The reasoning in Svenson’s case is not entirely clear. 135 Is Svenson’s art
exempt because it “fall[s] outside” the terms of the statute—perhaps because art
is thought to be something other than a “trade” good? 136 That would be a
categorization claim: use in art and use “for the purposes of trade” are different
things. Other New York courts had previously taken that approach with
sculpture, for example. Distinguishing the protected work of a sculptor who
wanted to make ten bronzes of model Cheryl Tiegs’s face from the unprotected
work of a commercial “manikin” manufacturer, a state court found in Simeonov
v. Tiegs 137 that the sculptor “is an artist who created a work of art”—a
“distinctive manner of human expression”—whereas “the manufacturer and
seller of the large number of manikins” “clearly was acting ‘for purposes of
trade.’” 138
The second half of the Svenson quotation suggests a different line of
reasoning, however: perhaps art’s “aesthetic” and “informational value” to the
public is more important than the privacy concerns of the individuals whose
images were used and sold. This is a balancing approach, and it too draws on
earlier cases from courts in New York. One federal decision, prompted by a
Barbara Kruger collage, rejected categorizing, which it said “invites judges to
decide what constitutes art or expression—and what does not—thus asking
them to . . . draw potentially artificial lines.” 139 Instead, the court determined
131. Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 163.
132. Id. at 158; see also id. at 159 (“In our view, artistic expression in the form of art work must
therefore be given the same leeway extended to the press under the newsworthy and public concern
exemption to the statutory tort of invasion of privacy.”).
133. 128 A.D.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
134. Id. at 156, 158–59. See generally Robert C. Post & Jennifer E. Rothman, The First Amendment
and the Right(s) of Publicity, 130 YALE L.J. 86, 158 n.311 (2020) (citing and discussing numerous court
decisions that either allowed or rejected exceptions from liability for artworks).
135. Robert Post and Jennifer Rothman’s important discussion of right of publicity cases finds
constitutionally salient distinctions among public discourse, commercial speech, and commodities. See
Post & Rothman, supra note 134, at 141–46, 156–62. For them, the level of First Amendment protection
turns on classifying something as a commodity rather than a contribution to public discourse, id. at 146
(calling the implications “enormous”), yet Post and Rothman clearly acknowledge that there is no
“magic bullet” or “mechanical ‘test’” for distinguishing one from the other, id. at 144, 159.
136. See id. at 158–59.
137. 159 Misc. 2d 54 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1993).
138. Id. at 55–56, 58–59.
139. Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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the reach of New York’s privacy law by carrying out “a careful weighing of
interests, on a case-by-case basis.” 140
In doing so, the Hoepker v. Kruger 141 court looked beyond New York to the
California supreme court’s well-known transformative use test—another selfdescribed “balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity.” 142 Borrowing from the fair use test in copyright, 143 the California
supreme court held in Comedy III Productions v. Saderup 144 that “when a work
contains significant transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of
First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the
economic interest protected by the right of publicity.” 145 The court cautioned
that artistic quality is irrelevant; what matters is “whether the literal and
imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.” 146 The more
creative the transformation, the heavier the First Amendment interests will
weigh in the balance against the economic concerns on the other side of the
scale. 147 Back in New York, the Hoepker court later summed up the test as asking
“whether it is the art, or the celebrity, that is being sold or displayed” when a
work of art includes a celebrity’s image. 148
A freewheeling balancing test like this may have more unpredictable
results 149 compared to a categorical rule that “any work of art, however much it
trespasses on the right of publicity and however much it lacks additional
creative elements, is categorically shielded from liability by the First
Amendment.” 150 But then again, it may not, as the categorical rule just shifts
the fight from what is sufficiently transformative to what is art. Part II will have
more to say about why that particular shift is unhelpful: even if the results
140. Id. at 348.
141. 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
142. Comedy III Prods. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001). Don’t be confused about the
terminological shift from “privacy” to “publicity” here. As Rothman has shown, New York’s privacy
law—the first in the nation—was from the start “primarily about the right to control ‘publicity’ about
oneself—when and how one’s image and name could be used by others in public.” Jennifer E. Rothman,
Featured Lecture, The Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined for New York?, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 573, 577 (2018). New York’s privacy law is still the state’s only “right of publicity” protection—in
contrast to California, which offers both common law and statutory protections. See JENNIFER E.
ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 82–86
(2018); see also Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 799–800.
143. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576–78 (1994).
144. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
145. Id. at 808.
146. Id. at 809.
147. See id. at 808. Rothman has argued powerfully that courts overemphasize economic rationales
for right of publicity protections rather than autonomy and dignitary concerns about how one’s identity
is used. See ROTHMAN, supra note 142 at 103–12, 154–57.
148. Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
149. For sharp criticism of this unpredictability, see ROTHMAN, supra note 142, at 147–49; Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 913–25 (2003).
150. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 809 n.11.
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happen to be more predictable—an open question—they are based on
considerations that do little to explain why some people, namely artists, should
get exemptions that other transformative creators and speakers lack. 151
The California supreme court’s test is not the only balancing test on
offer. 152 A prominent alternative comes from the Second Circuit, whose
decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi 153 allowed the use of a celebrity’s name in a movie
title unless it was “wholly unrelated to the movie” or was just a “disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” 154 In the suit,
Ginger Rogers brought both right of publicity and false advertising claims after
Fellini used “Ginger and Fred” as the title of a film. 155
Focusing on the Lanham Act’s 156 prohibition on false advertising, 157 the
Second Circuit rejected the categorical approach taken by the lower court,
which had refused to apply the Lanham Act to film titles at all since they were
said to be “within the realm of artistic expression” rather than serving “a
commercial purpose.” 158 “Movies, plays, books, and songs,” the Second Circuit
countered, are still “sold in the commercial marketplace like other more
utilitarian products.” 159 It makes little sense, then, to categorically exempt them
from false advertising law. “The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can
of peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.” 160
What is required instead is balancing: “only where the public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression”
does the Lanham Act apply. 161 A violation could occur either if the title has no
relevance to the work or if it explicitly misleads about the work’s source or
content. 162
Even though a work’s arthood does not immunize it from a Lanham Act
challenge, the Rogers court did still seem to make arthood relevant to its
balancing test. Consumers of art, after all, don’t rely on titles the same ways
151. See infra Section II.C.
152. Rothman says that “[a]t least five balancing approaches have been applied to evaluate First
Amendment defenses in right of publicity cases.” ROTHMAN, supra note 142, at 145.
153. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
154. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (first quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454,
457 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, J., concurring); and then quoting Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427
N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)); cf. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:144.50 (5th ed. 2020) (“The Second Circuit’s Rogers
balancing test is now widely used by almost all courts.”).
155. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996–97.
156. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n).
157. Id. § 43(a), 60 Stat. at 441.
158. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 120–21 (S.D.N.Y.
1988)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1006.
162. Id. at 999.
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they may rely on the label on a can of peas: “[M]ost consumers are well aware
that they cannot judge a book solely by its title any more than by its cover.” 163
This suggests an important difference between the balancing in cases like
Rogers versus that which may have been used in privacy/publicity cases like
Svenson: a work’s status as art seems to affect both sides of the balance in the
former but not the latter. Consumers are less likely to be led astray by
ambiguous or suggestive titles than they are by unclear or misleading product
labels; avoiding consumer confusion—the public interest opposed to the First
Amendment interests of the artist—is thus lessened by the fact that the product
is an artwork. Not so in the Svenson case: the fact that his images of his
neighbors are artworks does nothing to lessen their privacy concerns. If arthood
matters at all to the balancing in Svenson, it is only on the side of the artist, not
on both sides, as in Rogers.
The fact that the Rogers court talks in terms of artworks and their titles is
actually misleading, however. In fact, its test is not limited either to art or to
titles. For one thing, the holding applies to all titled works, not just to artworks.
Were the title of a law review article to include a celebrity’s name, the Rogers
test would still apply. The operative distinction is between labeled products and
titled works, and the set of titled things extends far beyond artworks. For
another thing, courts have used the Rogers test in cases where the content rather
than the title of works is what was said to mislead. Use of Tiger Woods’s
image, 164 a painting of the University of Alabama’s football uniforms, 165 the
well-known cover design of Cliffs Notes in a parody book 166—all have been
given the benefit of the speech-protective balancing test established in Rogers.
As a test that establishes the bounds of privacy, publicity, false advertising, and
trademark claims, Rogers balancing isn’t confined either to the category of titles
or the category of art.
2. Street Vending
New York City requires street vendors to have a permit, and the number
of permits has been capped at 853 for over forty years. 167 There have long been
exceptions, though: honorably discharged veterans are protected under state
law, and vendors of newspapers, magazines, and similar written matter have
been exempted since 1982. 168 (The City wrote these exemptions into the law as
163. Id. at 1000.
164. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003).
165. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012).
166. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 497 (2d Cir.
1989).
167. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 691–92 (2d Cir. 1996); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE §§ 20-452 to -455 (Westlaw through January 31, 2021). The permit requirement applies to
nonfood vendors. Id. §§ 20-452 to -453.
168. Id. at 698.
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a response to First Amendment worries.) 169 In the Giuliani era, with arrests on
the rise, 170 a group of painters, sculptors, and photographers challenged the
city’s regulations. As the district court described their claim: “Plaintiffs . . . take
the position that all works of fine art are forms of expression which fall under
the First Amendment’s protection of ‘speech.’” 171 The artists didn’t deny that
their artworks were subject to the terms of New York City’s general vendors’
law. Rather, they argued that the expressive value of “fine art” categorically
outweighs the concerns about sidewalk congestion that motived the New York
City Council to enact the vendors law in the first place. 172
When the artists’ case reached the Second Circuit as Bery v. City of New
173
York, the appellate court took a more fine-grained approach to what categories
it put on the balancing scales. It began by distinguishing “the crafts of the
jeweler, the potter and the silversmith”—whose work it described as only
sometimes expressive—from “paintings, photographs, prints and sculptures,”
which it said “always communicate some idea or concept to those who view
it.” 174 Having thus categorized, the court then proceeded to balance: New York
City, it found, had done nothing to show that its interests in reducing
congestion justified the expressive burden it imposed. 175 Along the way, the
court accepted the artists’ argument that alternative venues—private galleries,
for example—either weren’t available or were insufficient, since selling on the
street was itself part of the artists’ “expressive purpose.” 176 The artists received
their exemption. 177
In granting its medium-specific exemptions, the Bery court never explicitly
said that artists working in other mediums did not merit an exemption. That
task was left for a second case, Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 178 brought a
169. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 692.
170. David R. Francis, What Reduced Crime in New York City, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH.
DIG., Jan. 2003, at 2, 2–3, https://www.nber.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/jan03.PDF [https://
perma.cc/PL8C-46RX].
171. Bery v. City of New York, 906 F. Supp. 163, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
172. Cf. Bery, 97 F.3d at 697 (striking the balance in the artists’ favor, noting that the city had
pointed “to nothing on this record concerning its need to ensure street safety and lack of congestion
that would justify the imposition of the instant prohibitive interdiction barring the display and sale of
visual art on the City streets”).
173. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
174. Id. at 696.
175. Id. at 697.
176. Id. at 698.
177. Id. at 699. In a surprising turn of events that ended up being hugely consequential for New
York City sidewalks, the consent decree the city ultimately reached with the plaintiffs after the remand
in Bery provided a dramatically larger art exemption than the one originally requested. Bery v. City of
New York, No. 94-CIV-4253, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1997) (order granting permanent injunction).
Whereas the Second Circuit had affirmed a First Amendment right for painters, sculptors, printmakers,
and photographers to sell their work on city sidewalks, the consent decree allowed anyone to sell
paintings, sculpture, prints, and photographs without a permit. Id.
178. 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006).
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decade later by two artists who made and wanted to sell “clothing painted with
graffiti.” 179 Although the Second Circuit determined that their clothing had a
“predominantly expressive purpose,” 180 it did not accept the artists’ claim that
their works were paintings, thereby governed by the Bery decree. “The term
‘paintings,’” it held, “does not include baseball caps, jackets, and other articles
of clothing that have been artistically decorated with paints and markers.” 181
Thus, the Second Circuit categorized the graffiti artists’ painted clothing in a
middle-ground: expressive, thus not mere merchandise, but not painting, one
of the mediums of expression recognized in Bery.
The balancing test it then used was notably more deferential to the city
than the one applied in Bery. The vendor permit restriction should be upheld,
the court said, as long as the government’s interests “would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation.” 182 This is a hard test for the government to lose,
unless it acts gratuitously. 183 Here, any broadened exemption would surely
increase the number of vendors and cause at least some marginal increase in
sidewalk congestion.
The licensing requirement that was struck down as insufficiently tailored
when applied to painting, prints, photographs, and sculpture in Bery was found
to be narrowly tailored and upheld when applied to the goods in Mastrovincenzo.
The different outcomes had four causes: (1) the Mastrovincenzo plaintiffs, unlike
those in Bery, never claimed that selling on the street was part of their works’
meaning; (2) by talking up their artistic bona fides, the Mastrovincenzo plaintiffs
undermined their argument that other venues, like galleries, were unavailable
to them; (3) the Mastrovincenzo court expected that line drawing problems
would be greater for “policemen on the beat” 184 when art is made out of t-shirts
and hats rather than the “more-easily-classified” mediums protected in Bery; 185
and finally; (4) Bery and Mastrovincenzo applied different balancing tests: a more
stringent one for traditional mediums of expression and another, more lenient
one, for “less orthodox modes of communication.” 186
The different balancing tests employed in Bery versus Mastrovincenzo are
exactly what John Hart Ely predicted in his 1975 essay, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis. 187
179. Id. at 82.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 103.
182. Id. at 98 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989)).
183. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 (1975); see also id. at 1486 (“[L]egislatures
simply do not enact wholly useless provisions.”).
184. Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 95.
185. Id. at 102.
186. Ely, supra note 183, at 1488.
187. See id.
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Ely noted that the test offered in O’Brien—which, as we have seen, 188 pits the
government’s non-speech-related reasons for regulating against the regulation’s
incidental burdens on expression 189—can be understood in two different ways.
Courts can uphold regulatory burdens as “no greater than essential” either
because (1) alternative regulations would serve the government’s interest less
effectively; 190 or (2) the marginal difference in effectiveness between a
regulation and its alternatives outweighs the burden on communication. 191 Ely
argued that the Supreme Court has unconsciously chosen to reserve the second,
more speech-protective mode of balancing “for relatively familiar or traditional
means of expression, such a pamphlets, pickets, public speeches and rallies . . .
and to relegate other, less orthodox modes of communication to the weak, nay
useless, ‘no gratuitous inhibition’ approach.” 192
More recently, Robert Post has similarly highlighted the significance of
what he calls “First Amendment media.” 193 According to Post, two independent
considerations can or should trigger First Amendment scrutiny: (1) the nature
of the governmental interests served by a regulation, and (2) “whether the
regulation . . . seeks to restrict a recognized medium for the communication of
ideas.” 194 The two relevant questions, in other words, are: “Why does the state
regulate?” and “What does it regulate?” 195 The latter question looks not to
individual acts of expression, but to the medium through which the expression
occurs. As Post writes: “The very concept of a medium presupposes that
constitutionally protected expression does not inhere in abstract and
disembodied acts of communication . . . but is instead always conveyed through
social and material forms of interaction.” 196 Surprisingly few other authors have

188. See supra Section I.A.1.
189. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
190. Ely, supra note 183, at 1484–85. This is the version of the balancing test applied in O’Brien
itself. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377–78.
191. See id. at 1486–87. Ely offers the example of anti-handbill ordinances: banning them would
decrease litter, but the cost to expression would outweigh the benefit.
192. Id. at 1488–89; see also id. at 1490 (“[I]t seems likely that the Court will continue, either
explicitly or implicitly, to distinguish between familiar and unorthodox modes of communication in
deciding whether genuinely to balance in evaluating less restrictive alternatives or rather simply assure
itself, as it will always be able to, that no gratuitous inhibition of expression has been effected.”).
193. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1995)
[hereinafter Post, Recuperating].
194. Id. at 1255–56.
195. Id. at 1255.
196. Id. at 1257; see also Post & Rothman, supra note 134, at 137, 159–60 (noting that the
“boundaries of . . . categories [are] anything but obvious” and, consequently, courts struggle to
determine what gets First Amendment protection).
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given sustained attention to the role mediums of expression play in the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment doctrine. 197
Mastrovincenzo hints at both the dangers and the benefits of using
mediums of expression to determine the strength of the First Amendment
balancing test that courts apply. On the downside, reliance on traditional
mediums of expression is inherently conservative; almost by definition, it favors
that which is traditional. 198 We see that in Bery and Mastrovincenzo: canvas
painting receives protection that graffiti art does not. 199 But Mastrovincenzo also
shows an upside of treating different mediums differently. Attending to
mediums allows courts to notice that regulatory needs may vary from one
medium to another. In Mastrovincenzo, the court worried that police would have
a harder time distinguishing expressive from nonexpressive painted t-shirts
than they would have distinguishing paintings, prints, photographs, and
sculptures from other types of merchandise. This made exemptions more costly
in Mastrovincenzo compared to Bery, and it helped justify the different results
in those two cases.
The lesson is that traditional mediums may be easier to distinguish than
newer modes of expression—or borderline instances of the old modes; this
makes it easier to grant them exemptions without sliding down slippery slopes.
The question, to which we will return in Parts II and III, 200 is whether certain
mediums of expression can be picked out and privileged for reasons germane to
law or whether judges will simply favor the mediums they, and people like
them, 201 know and enjoy.
Questions like these become especially consequential when less traditional
forms of expression are pitted against laws promoting equality.

197. See infra Section III.A. For a recent and particularly sensitive discussion of mediums offered
for another purpose entirely, see Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 324–31 (2019); See also Ryan
S. Bezerra, What Dalzell Saw: Medium-Specific Analysis Under the First Amendment, 17 GLENDALE L.
REV. 1, 4 (1999) (“This Paper explores how the Court analyzes First Amendment cases by focusing on
how the government regulation at issue flows from or affects the underlying technology or physical
characteristics of the impacted medium of expression and how this mode of analysis is consistent with
the most widely accepted theory of the purpose of the First Amendment.”).
198. Cf. Ely, supra note 183, at 1489 (expressing the worry that “only orthodox modes of expression
will be protected”).
199. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (“‘[P]aintings,’ as
it is . . . used and understood in common parlance, refers not to all goods that are ‘painted’ but only
and specifically to painted canvases.”). While graffiti might constitute its own medium of expression,
in Mastrovincenzo itself it was perhaps being used more as a style rather than a medium.
200. See infra notes Sections II.C, III.B.1.
201. See generally Danielle Root, Jake Faleschini & Grace Oyenubi, Building a More Inclusive Federal
Judiciary, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/courts/reports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusive-federal-judiciary/ [https://perma.cc/N59X
-Z7EU] (describing the federal judiciary’s lack of diversity in regard to race, gender, sexual orientation,
religion, and educational and employment background).
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3. Antidiscrimination Law
The case that made it to the Supreme Court as Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission 202 began in 2012 when Charlie Craig and Dave
Mullins were planning a reception to celebrate their wedding. 203 Needing a
cake, they visited Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado. 204
Masterpiece Cakeshop qualifies as a public accommodation under
Colorado state law, so it has to provide customers the “equal enjoyment of [its]
goods” without discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. 205 The store’s
owner, Jack Phillips, argued that this violated his Free Speech and Free Exercise
rights by “compelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a message
with which he disagreed,” 206 by forcing him to participate “in celebrating what
he regards as a religious event,” 207 and by treating religious opponents of samesex marriage (like Phillips) differently than those who support it. 208
The first of these arguments was emphatically framed as an artistic
exemption claim. And as such, it was clearly a balancing, not a categorizing one.
No one disputed the fact that Phillips’s cakes were goods sold to the public,
subject to Colorado’s public accommodations law. Phillips’s claim was rather
that his “artistic freedom” or “artistic voice” 209 was more important than Craig
and Mullins’ freedom from discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Phillips’s art exemption claim didn’t prevail, although he did: seven
Justices found in his favor on Free Exercise grounds. 210 Only Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Gorsuch, discussed Phillips’s claimed artistic exemption.
Justice Thomas noted that “Phillips considers himself an artist,” his business
logo includes “an artist’s paint palette,” and Phillips’s shop “has a picture that
depicts him as an artist painting on a canvas.” 211 Further, “Phillips takes
exceptional care with each cake that he creates.” 212 All of this was marshalled as
evidence that his conduct was expressive. The majority, meanwhile, bypassed
talk of art entirely, noting only that differences between cakes decorated with

202. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
203. Id. at 1724.
204. Id.
205. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (LEXIS through all laws passed during the 2020
Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Legis. Sesss. and Measures approved at the November 2020 Gen. Election).
206. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
207. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL
3913762, at *15 [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for Petitioners].
208. Id.
209. Id. at 28.
210. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–32; cf. id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
211. Id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
212. Id.
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words, cakes bearing symbols, and premade versus custom-made cakes together
made the “free speech aspect” of the case “difficult.” 213
The Court’s punt on these issues will surely be returned. Not only has the
issue come up previously in a more solidly artistic context—wedding
photography 214 —but it continues to be raised in cases brought by wedding
florists, videographers, website designers, and others, including Phillips
himself, who has been involved in two subsequent discrimination claims. 215
Given the future challenges to come, it is worth considering three
positions on art’s relevance that were voiced in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Phillips’s
claim was that “the Free Speech Clause applies because” his cakes “are his artistic
expression.” 216 According to his Supreme Court brief, he is as protected by the
First Amendment as “a modern painter or sculptor, and his greatest
masterpieces—his custom wedding cakes—are just as worthy of constitutional
protection as an abstract painting like Piet Mondrian’s Broadway Boogie Woogie,
a modern sculpture like Alexander Calder’s Flamingo, or a temporary artistic
structure like Christo and Jeanne-Claude’s Running Fence.” 217 The United States
sided with Phillips, arguing that a “custom wedding cake can be sufficiently
artistic to qualify as pure speech.” 218
Unwilling to go that far, another group thought the case turned on
mediums, not the concept of art. 219 Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh, who
had supported an exemption for a wedding photographer in a previous case,

213. Id. at 1723 (majority opinion).
214. See Elane Photography, LLC, v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 63 (N.M. 2013).
215. See, e.g., Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 2019) (wedding
videographers); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 746 F. App’x 709, 710 (10th Cir. 2018) (wedding website
designers); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 896 (Ariz. 2019) (discussing
wedding invitation designers); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Wash. 2019),
petition for cert. filed, No. 19-333 (Sept. 11, 2019) (wedding florists); see also Brasch, supra note 27
(describing the second and third complaints filed against Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop).
216. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for Petitioners, supra note 207, at 16–17 (emphasis added). Phillips
in fact went further, claiming that Colorado not only couldn’t compel art making like his, see id. at 28
(“By enthroning itself as master of Phillips’s artistic voice, the [Colorado Civil Rights] Commission
invaded the freedom that the First Amendment promises to artists.”), but that it couldn’t even order
Phillips to report what commissions he declines. According to his brief, “the very notion of artistic
freedom chafes at a requirement that Phillips must give an account to the government for the use of
his artistic discretion.” Id.
217. Id. at 20–21; see also id. at 20 (“Like any good work of art, Phillips’s wedding cakes convey
messages that address not only ‘the intellect’ but also ‘the emotions’ of observers.”).
218. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for the United States]
(“[J]ust as a painter does more than simply apply paint to a canvas, a baker of a custom wedding cake
does more than simply mix together eggs, flour, and sugar: Both apply their artistic talents and
viewpoints to the endeavor.”).
219. Brief of American Unity Fund & Profs. Dale Carpenter & Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4918194,
at *1 [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Carpenter/Volokh Brief].
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drew the line at Masterpiece Cakeshop, arguing that it “would trivialize the First
Amendment” to say that “baked goods, including very beautiful ones or ones
intended for special occasions, are protected forms of ‘art.’” 220 Their suggested
test to differentiate painting, music, poetry, and parades from cake baking,
clothing design, and hairstyling looks at whether a particular medium is
inherently expressive or has historically been used for expressive purposes. 221
Other First Amendment scholars went further, arguing that neither the
cake’s status as art, nor cake-making’s potential recognition as a traditional
medium of expression, mattered in Masterpiece Cakeshop. As one prominent
amicus group said, “The Court does not need to decide here whether bakers are
artists,” for even Rembrandt would be subject to generally applicable
antidiscrimination laws were he to put his paintings up for sale in the window
of his shop. 222 Artists and artisans 223 both can be forced to sell their artistry to
all comers; they just cannot be forced to create new messages. 224 Going further
still, amicus Tobias Wolff agreed with the point about paintings placed in the
window 225 but argued in addition that “an artist who sets up a business in which
she sells her skills to any paying customer in the commercial marketplace is no

220. Id. at *14; see also id. at *10 (“Nor can wedding cakes be viewed as inherently expressive, or
traditionally protected, simply by raising the level of generality and calling wedding-cake-making
‘art’.”).
221. Id. at *6–14; see also id. at *7 (“[W]hen the medium as a whole mainly consists of items that
do not convey a message (except perhaps insofar as words may be written on them), it is not protected
by the First Amendment—even when the items may be designed with aesthetics in mind and even
when the creator subjectively intends to ‘express’ something by the creation.”).
222. Brief of Floyd Abrams et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief of Abrams et al.] (“If
Rembrandt van Rijn puts ‘The Descent from the Cross’ in his shop window . . . the First Amendment
would not condemn a law that says he may not refuse on grounds of ethnicity or religion the business
of a Flemish man who wished to hang the painting in a Roman Catholic church.”).
223. While Post was a signatory to this brief, he drew a sharper distinction between artists and
artisans in other contemporaneous writing. To quote his argument, which prefigures mine to come:
We do not debate and articulate the meaning of current events through the medium of
wedding cakes. We do not carry on national debates through the medium of flowers, cooking,
jewelry or furniture. . . . [H]eightened First Amendment scrutiny has typically been reserved
for laws that distort meanings conveyed in what the Court has called ‘media for the
communication of ideas,’ in which participants are understood to be self-consciously seeking
to address public ideas and matters.
Robert Post, An Analysis of DOJ’s Brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE (Oct. 18, 2017) [hereinafter
Post, An Analysis], https://takecareblog.com/blog/an-analysis-of-doj-s-brief-in-masterpiece-cakeshop
[https://perma.cc/JQ7J-6KMS].
224. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief of Abrams et al., supra note 222, at 4–6.
225. Brief of Professor Tobias B. Wolff as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16–17,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief of Wolff].

99 N.C. L. REV. 685 (2021)

718

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

longer engaged in the creation of her own work.” 226 Artists engaged in
businesses like this are communicating the customer’s message, not their own. 227
The wedding vendor cases are by far the highest profile, but certainly not
the only place where the arts run up against antidiscrimination laws. Consider
this: since Title VII prohibits employers from hiring based on race—even when
race is claimed to be a “bona fide occupational qualification” 228—casting an allBlack Porgy and Bess 229 or exclusively minority actors as Founding Fathers in
Hamilton violates federal employment discrimination law. Yet for all the racebased casting on Broadway and in Hollywood, 230 shockingly few cases have been
brought to challenge it, and even fewer scholarly articles have analyzed the
issue. 231
There have, however, been arts-related challenges to race discrimination
in contracting, including recently at the Supreme Court. The leading case under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 comes from Tennessee, where two Black men sued producers
of the Bachelor/Bachelorette franchise. 232 The first twenty-four seasons of the
show had all featured White bachelors or bachelorettes and mostly White
suitors. Plaintiffs argued that American Broadcasting Company was responding
to—and reinforcing—its viewers’ distaste for interracial couples. 233 The case
was dismissed at the outset, however: the district court found that television
programs are among the “artistic forms of expression” the First Amendment
protects and allowing plaintiffs’ claims would necessarily affect the content and
message these particular shows were (allegedly) trying to convey. 234
Last Term, the Supreme Court heard another § 1981 claim, this one
concerning a cable provider’s channel lineup. 235 The petition for writ of
226. Id. at 15.
227. Id. at 12–13.
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting race discrimination in hiring); id. § 2000e-2(e)
(offering a bona fide occupational qualification exception for hiring based on sex, religion, or national
origin, but not race or color). As Post notes, Congress was aware of the issue raised by race-conscious
casting in theater and film when it debated Title VII, but it failed to deal with the problem. See Robert
Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 37
n.169 (2000).
229. See Michael Cooper, The Complex History and Uneasy Present of ‘Porgy and Bess’, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/arts/music/porgy-bess-gershwin-metropolitan-opera.html
[https://perma.cc/QD7W-ZK87] (Sept. 21, 2019) (describing how the Gershwins, in order to avoid
performances in blackface, dictated that only Black performers could be cast in their opera—a licensing
requirement still in effect for all worldwide productions).
230. A study of three months’ worth of casting announcements (or “breakdowns”) in 2006 found
that 22.5% listed the role’s race as White and 8.1% as Black. See Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Casteing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2007).
231. Russell Robinson’s 2007 article on the subject is the major exception. Id. at 1–2.
232. Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 988–89 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (suing
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
233. Id. at 989. For an explanation of the capitalization choices here, see supra note 28.
234. Id. at 993, 999–1000.
235. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020).
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certiorari in a companion case had argued that if cable companies were to be
prohibited from taking account of race, the creators of Hamilton might be forced
to cast a White George Washington. 236 But the Court chose to hear a different
case, and the resulting opinion clarified the causation standard for § 1981 claims
without discussing art or freedom of expression at all.
These are important, potentially sweeping, artistic exemption claims. But
since courts have not done much grappling with them so far, I too will push off
doing so until the discussion of future cases in Part III. 237
*

* *

Part I has shown artistic exemptions taking different forms. Categorizers
argue that a certain law does not apply to artworks, while balancers acknowledge
that it does, but insist that it shouldn’t, since the art’s expressive value
outweighs whatever value the law in question is meant to promote.
These two modes of argument are not as different as they first seem,
however. Often the metaphysical distinctions at the heart of the categorizing
arguments really have value judgments right under the surface. If pole dancing
does not count as a choreographic performance for tax purposes in New York,
that is surely because of value judgments about what dance is worth subsidizing,
not just ontological arguments about the nature of dance. Meanwhile, the
balancers generally don’t weigh the value of individual works, but entire
categories—whether the paintings, prints, sculptures, or photographs at issue in
Bery, the custom wedding cakes in Masterpiece Cakeshop, or the art photography
in Svenson. When the balancing comes out in favor of some category of
expression, definitional arguments return, as artists like Mastrovincenzo try to
show that their work also falls within one of the now-protected categories.
Insofar as the categorizing and balancing modes of argument blur into each
other, it is because courts actually tend to employ a form of categorical balancing,
where the relevant categories to be balanced are often mediums of expression.
Importantly, art is not itself a medium of expression. Art is not among the
categories that should get balanced under the First Amendment. As the next
part shows, the category “art” actually does no constitutional work at all.
II. ART’S IRRELEVANCE
Those seeking exemptions for art, as did nearly all the claimants described
in Part I, 238 have a heavy burden to shoulder: they need to provide some
limiting principle sufficient to keep art exemptions from swallowing the rule of
236. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Comcast, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (No. 18-1171).
237. See infra Section III.B.2.
238. The one exception is the group of street vendors who argued in Bery on behalf of four specific
mediums of expression: painting, sculpture, photography, and prints. See supra Section I.B.2.
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law. And this principle needs to be one that goes some distance toward
explaining why certain things (artworks), unlike other things, deserve
exemptions from otherwise applicable laws.
I doubt that those seeking art exemptions can meet this burden. But
fortunately, there is no need to do so. The cases above presented another option.
Oftentimes, courts have looked to individual mediums of expression rather than
art as a whole in artistic exemption cases. 239 And for good reason. Insofar as
mediums of expression differ in large part based on their materiality—the very
thing most likely to raise legal issues—they are uniquely relevant categories to
use in deciding when exemptions under the First Amendment should be
possible.
Looking to mediums of expression rather than some overarching notion of
art also allows us to draw on the disciplinary expertise of practitioners and
scholars working within each medium. The way we talk of “artists,” “artsy
people,” or “art scholars” masks the fact that practitioners create and scholars
research not across art in general, but within specific mediums. “Artists” are
really painters or architects, musicians, dancers, or playwrights—or maybe some
specific combination but not all of the above. Art historians do something
different than musicologists, dramaturgs, and so on; scholars and critics too tend
to be similarly rooted in particular disciplines. We sometimes lump various
disciplines together—under a heading like “the fine arts”—but these groupings
are historically contingent and evolving. As I describe below, the various arts
may be linked through a chain of analogies, such that every art has something
in common with another art, but that doesn’t mean that the various arts all share
anything in common. There are no necessary and sufficient conditions that
would explain why the various arts should be treated the same way under the
law or why they should be treated differently than non-art expression within
the same medium. There is no apparent reason why literature, for example,
should get the same exemptions as sculpture, theater, architecture, or ballet—
or why it should get any protection beyond that given to non-artistic, everyday
prose (like the text you are reading right now).
The rest of Part II develops this normative argument.
A.

Art Versus the Arts

Dominic McIver Lopes is among the leading contemporary philosophers
of art. 240 But that label fits Lopes somewhat awkwardly. For as he has
powerfully argued, philosophy of art’s primary task—searching for a theory of
art, an answer to the question: What makes object x a work of art?—is best
239. Supra Section I.B.
240. Noël Carroll, Medium Specificity, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
FILM AND MOTION PICTURES 29, 35 (2019) (referring to Lopes as a “leading philosopher[] of art”).
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pursued by “passing the buck” to two other theoretical projects. 241 First is a
theory of the arts, which seeks to explain why painting and sculpture, for example,
should count among “the arts,” while fishing and skateboarding do not. A theory
of the arts explains what makes certain kinds of objects or activities art. The
second project is to develop theories of individual arts. These explain what makes
a given object a painting or a certain activity a dance. Lopes argues that an
account of what makes something architecture will necessarily differ from an
account of what makes something music, and so on for each art, because theories
of the arts must take account of the physical medium associated with each. 242
Lopes’s buck-passing theory of art holds that something is a work of art if
and only if it is a work that is part of some art kind. 243 So, for example, the
Mona Lisa is a work of art because the Mona Lisa is a painting, and painting is
one of the arts. The challenge is thus to explain what makes something a
painting and what makes painting an art. The difference between this and the
traditional task for the philosophy of art—coming up with a theory of art—is
that, unlike a theory of art, Lopes’s buck-passing account does not require that
all artworks share any particular trait. 244 Paintings might all share a trait—for
example, being painted!—without that trait needing to apply also to music or
dance or architecture.
Significantly for our purposes here, Lopes argues that we are more likely
to succeed in asking whether certain hard cases should be categorized as part of
an art kind rather than asking directly whether they count as art. 245 In other
words, it will be easier to decide whether Duchamp’s Fountain is sculpture 246 or
Cage’s 4’33” is music 247 than to find some single principle by which we can say
directly that both are art. In part, this is because the set of things that even
arguably qualify as sculpture or music is far narrower and more homogenous
than the set of things that are arguably art. (No one wonders whether 4’33” is
sculpture, or if Fountain is an opera.) Finding workable definitions of each
individual art is thus far more likely than defining art as a whole.
Moreover, Lopes observes, “Art as a whole is not the object of any field of
empirical inquiry. That is, there are no serious psychological, anthropological,

241. DOMINIC MCIVER LOPES, BEYOND ART 11–15 (2014).
242. Id. at 15.
243. See id.
244. See, e.g., id. at 62.
245. Id. at 63.
246. The urinal that Marcel Duchamp signed and dated was rejected for exhibition by the Society
of Independent Artists in 1917. See DANTO, WHAT ART IS, supra note 73, at 26–28.
247. See Stephen Davies, John Cage’s 4’33”: Is It Music?, 75 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 448, 448 (1997)
(discussing Cage’s score, written for any instrument, instructing the performer to remain silent for four
minutes and thirty-three seconds).
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sociological, or historical hypotheses about all and only works of art.” 248 Lopes
argues that his buck-passing theory “sends us off to theorize about the more
specific phenomena that absorb the hours of musicologists, anthropologists of
dance, sociologists of photography, and their peers.” 249
One final philosophical point before turning back to law. Everything just
said about definitional buck passing—shifting from defining art to defining the
various arts—can be said as well about aesthetic or artistic value. In other words,
instead of giving a unified account of what counts as good art, we might instead
pass the buck and try to decide what is valuable in painting, in music, in
architecture, and so on. 250
So what does all of this tell us about art’s role in constitutional law? Several
things, I hope.
First, anyone who claims that art or art making merits an exemption from
the law needs something like a theory of art. Without some criterion shared
across the set of things called artworks, it is hard to see why those particular
things should together qualify for an exemption.
My summary of Lopes’s buck-passing account of art does not prove that
it is impossible to define art directly—to identify the criterion that those
claiming art exemptions would need. But it does give good reason to believe
that focusing on individual arts instead is more likely to succeed. This is both
because we’re more likely to find commonalities among the objects that are put
forward, say, as sculpture than among all the things said to be art, and also
because the individual arts are the subject of practical and scholarly knowledge
in a way that art itself is not. These are reasons to think that passing the buck
and considering exemptions for specific arts are likely to be more cabined and
focused than considering exemptions for art in general. In any case, the burden
is on those who think otherwise. They are the ones who need to offer a theory
of art—one that helps justify exemptions and suggests how they’ll be feasibly
limited.
Second, a corollary of the first point: insofar as art exemption claims
involve a balancing of values, focusing on specific arts rather than art in general
should again prove more helpful. As before, Lopes doesn’t disprove the
possibility of offering a unified account of aesthetic or artistic value. But he
suggests that it will be far easier to develop an account of what makes
photography or architecture or poetry good than to find some good-making
feature that all forms share. 251 Since balancing requires that we know what value
248. LOPES, supra note 241, at 65. Lopes argues that when people say “art,” they are either thinking
of one or several of the particular arts, or they are talking more broadly about “products of culture at
large.” Id. at 66.
249. Id. at 82.
250. See id. at 101–03.
251. Id. at 63.
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should be placed on art’s side of the balance, Lopes’s buck-passing account
suggests that we will be more successful if we weigh each art separately. At the
end of Part I, I suggested that categorical balancing of this sort is exactly what
most courts have actually done.
Third, we can learn from what Lopes says about that to which his buckpassing theory passes the buck: the various arts. These are narrower categories,
obviously, than art itself, but also narrower than midlevel categories like “visual
arts,” “narrative arts,” and “performing arts.” 252 At the same time, the individual
arts are generally broader categories than genres (like rap, or Westerns), styles
(like Mannerism), or oeuvres (like that of Mozart). 253 Lopes proposes that the
arts are individuated by their medium, where medium is defined as a resource
(often material like canvas, stone, bodies, or tones) to which a technique
(drawing, printing, carving, arranging, and so on) is applied. 254
Without wading too far into the weeds of how to individuate various
mediums of expression, we can already see a major advantage of talking about
individual arts rather than art in general. Individual arts are differentiated by
medium. The concept of art, by contrast, combines a wide variety of mediums.
And yet it is precisely the medium—the materiality of an artwork and/or the
techniques applied there—that is most likely, and properly, the subject of legal
regulation.
To give a few examples: The most likely and legitimate reason to regulate
music is because of its volume. 255 Depictions by actors in the theater and movies
raise potential regulatory issues that depictions in novels and paintings do not,
for the former involve real people. 256 The law might therefore care, legitimately,
that the actors involved in theater and movies are underage or are denied
employment because of their race. Poorly designed architecture can cause harm
of a different sort than a bad poem: unlike the poem, architecture can cause
physical injury and environmental damage, and even its purely aesthetic
demerits can intrude upon passersby or the neighbors across the street, whereas
bad poems can more easily be avoided.
The law’s willingness to countenance art exemptions surely needs to be
sensitive to the varied harms the various arts potentially pose. And these threats
are most likely to vary based on the distinctive medium each art employs.
Regulating novels is almost always going to be a regulation of content or

252. See id. at 134.
253. Id. at 133.
254. Id. at 139.
255. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
256. Thus, a movie version of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita raises concerns that the novel itself does
not because, in the movie, the stepfather’s sexual obsessions are directed at a character that either must
be played by an actual young girl or else moviemakers need to find an older actor who can convincingly
play a twelve-year-old.
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expression, for what else about a novel is likely to cause harm? But that puts
novels in a very different relation to law than architecture, or photography, or
performance art. To quote again a deep insight offered by the Supreme Court
in a 1975 theater case: “Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for
First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its
own problems.” 257
B.

The Arts Versus Mediums of Expression

But here an objection arises: How have I shown the concept of art to be
irrelevant if all I’ve done is switch from talking about art to talking about artistic
mediums—that is to say, “the arts”? In Lopes’s terms, how far has the buck been
passed if, rather than talking about a theory of art, we simply start talking about
a theory of the arts—a set of conditions that allows us to treat certain kinds of
things as art kinds, and therefore candidates for exemptions?
Two responses, one much bolder than the other:
First, finding a satisfactory definition of “the arts” is as unlikely as finding
necessary and sufficient conditions for “art” itself. 258 Lopes himself thinks that
“disputes over the art status of various activities appeal to analogies and
disanalogies that hold only among subsets of the arts.” 259 In other words, rather
than finding something all of the arts have in common, new arts get recognized
by establishing similarities with neighboring arts, not the whole set. The art
status of video games, for example, “is often established by stressing their
connections to cinema but they may be viewed instead as the popular
counterpart of avant-garde computer art.” 260 Video games don’t have to show
something in common with sculpture or ballet to be accepted among the arts.
What is included or not therefore depends on what is already there. The
list is historically variable and path dependent. 261 In a pair of famous articles
from the early 1950s, Paul Oskar Kristeller traced the emergence of what he
called the “modern system of the arts” during the eighteenth century. 262 Only
then, Kristeller argued, did the notion of the “fine arts” come to be systematized

257. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
258. See, e.g., LOPES, supra note 241, at 119.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 118 (citations omitted). Notably, the Supreme Court took a similar approach when it
extended First Amendment coverage to video games. “Like the protected books, plays, and movies that
preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar
literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).” Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
261. See, e.g., LOPES, supra note 241, at 118.
262. Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts (I), 12 J. HIST. IDEAS 496, 497 (1951)
[hereinafter Kristeller, Arts (I)]; Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts (II), 13 J. HIST.
IDEAS 17, 17 (1952) [hereinafter Kristeller, Arts (II)].
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as painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and poetry. 263 Earlier groupings—
like the liberal arts or the list of Muses—tended to lump music with
mathematics or astronomy, poetry with grammar, and visual art with manual
crafts. 264 Later, once the five canonical arts had been established, others like
dance, theater, opera, prose literature, and (perhaps more surprising to us now)
gardening sometimes did, or sometimes didn’t, get included as well. 265
At the time, commentators tried to show that “the ‘imitation of beautiful
nature’ is the principle common to all the arts.” 266 Clearly, that will no longer
work as a unifying principle for the arts today, where both beauty and imitation
are, at best, optional qualities. But even if it did work as a unifying principle,
“imitation of beautiful nature” is a criterion that wouldn’t do much to suggest
why the arts should be a candidate for legal exemptions. The point, which the
following section revisits, is that even if some satisfying definition of art or the
arts were found, it still might not give us any reason to think that art (or the
arts) merits special constitutional protection.
And indeed it doesn’t. The real answer to the objection—that talk of
artistic mediums continues to make art relevant to constitutional law—is to
acknowledge the unlikelihood of finding a criterion shared amongst artistic
mediums and to go a step further: to say that it makes no constitutional sense
to subdivide mediums of expression into that which is and is not artistic. Some
prose is literary, other prose is not. What matters to the First Amendment is
that prose is a traditional, indeed vital, medium of expression. That some prose
might also be deemed art does not change the level of protection it does or
should receive.
To be clear, then, this is where my concerns diverge from those of Lopes,
writing within the philosophy of art rather than constitutional law. Unlike his,
my claim is not that we need to pass the buck from talk of art to talk of the arts
and, ultimately, to the question of whether some object belongs within one of
those arts. My claim is that, in law, we need to move from talk of art—
unpromising and misleading as it is—to talk of mediums of expression.
Decisions about whether to recognize some medium of expression for First
Amendment coverage purposes will, like Lopes’s theory of the arts, rely on
analogies from one to another—not commonalities among them all.
Recognizing a new medium of expression 267 is not applying a necessary and

263.
264.
265.
266.

Kristeller, Arts (I), supra note 262, at 497.
Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 497.
Kristller, Arts (II), supra note 262, at 21 (citing CHARLES BATTEUX, LES BEAUX ARTS
RÉDUITS À UN MÊME PRINCIPE (1747)).
267. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (departing from an earlier
Supreme Court decision treating movies as commercial spectacles and holding instead that “motion
pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 685 (2021)

726

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

sufficient condition to a new set of things; it is finding a historically contingent
but relevant line from a recognized medium or mediums to some new one. The
point is that the medium of expression could be an artistic one (like music), a
non-artistic one (like billboards), or a mixed one (like video games). Talk of
mediums of expression is not limited to artistic mediums or the subset of things
within a mixed medium that count as art. 268 Whether something is expressed
using a traditional medium of expression matters greatly. The concept of art
does not.
C.

The Informative Failure of Leading Theories of Art

The argument just made rests on pessimism about the prospects of any
overarching theory of art, much less one that could justify legal exemptions. By
contrast, employing mediums of expression is not only more manageable, but
by individuating forms of expression based on their medium, it focuses our
attention on the very thing about art that the law most likely and legitimately
wants to regulate.
It’s worth noting, however, that there are overarching theories of art
currently on offer. In fact, producing them is something of a cottage industry
within contemporary philosophy of art. 269 Before moving on, then, this section
looks briefly at three of the most prominent or promising theories to see how
they fare. This serves two important purposes. First, it shows that even if these
theories of art were successful—and not wildly over- or underinclusive as their
critics claim—they would still not explain why art, so defined, is a category of
things that merit exemptions from otherwise applicable laws. 270 Second, and
even more importantly, these theories, despite their faults, may help explain
268. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“The line between the informing
and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. . . . Though we can see nothing
of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free
speech as the best of literature.”).
269. See, e.g., STEPHEN DAVIES, DEFINITIONS OF ART 1 (1991) (outlining and developing a
perspective on the debate in Anglo-American philosophy about the definition of art); Robert Stecker,
Definition of Art, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AESTHETICS 137, 137 (Jerrold Levinson ed., 2003)
(surveying the primary trends marking the history of the project of defining art in the twentieth
century); Thomas Adajian, The Definition of Art, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/art-definition [https://perma.cc/F6Y8UU2V] (“The definition of art is controversial in contemporary philosophy. Whether art can be defined
has also been a matter of controversy.”).
270. Philosophical or theoretical reasons are not the only ones which might justify special
constitutional treatment for a concept like art. There might also, for example, be historical reasons for
doing so. We see this in Germany, whose constitutional court has justified the extent of the Basic Law’s
explicit protection for art by contrasting it with “the artistic policy of the Nazi regime.”
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 173 (Ger.), translated at
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=1478
[https://perma.cc/7VM5-52V3].
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why “art” has the rhetorical power in law that it clearly does. This section thus
provides an error theory that partially explains why arthood is invoked so often
if it really has the constitutional irrelevance I claim it to have. The three theories
that follow have shaped our constitutional jurisprudence in important ways
even if they have failed to provide a concept of art that provides a categorical
ground for exemptions.
First, consider the Institutional Theory of Art (“Institutional Theory”),
according to which “something is a work of art as a result of its being dubbed
. . . a work of art by someone who is authorized thereby to make it an artwork
by her position within the institution of the Artworld.” 271 To avoid getting lost
in technicalities, I’ll describe this and each of the following theories in
connection to its main proponent. For the Institutional Theory, that is the
philosopher of art George Dickie. 272
Putting aside the circularity of Dickie’s definition—which defines art in
terms of an Artworld, and an Artworld in terms of art 273—we might in the
present context worry more about why the decisions of something called “the
Artworld” should be a source of constitutional exemptions to the law. The fact
that the Institutional Theory is a procedural rather than substantive theory of
art—regardless of whether that makes it better or worse as a theory—certainly
makes it less useful in justifying exemptions. After all, the theory gives us no
reason to believe that the Artworld’s reasons for dubbing something “art”
correspond in any way with values the First Amendment is meant to promote.
Worse, for the law to treat expressive objects differently based on the whims of
the Artworld could raise worries that, depending on how the Artworld is
constituted, it might perpetuate conservative, “institutionalist” biases against
outsider art and other expression, especially by minorities or other
nonprivileged speakers. For the law to adopt and enforce these prejudices is
constitutionally problematic in its own right. 274
At the same time, in discussing mediums of expression above, I wrote of
the practical and scholarly knowledge that has developed within many such
271. DAVIES, supra note 269, at 8. See generally id. at 78–114.
272. See, e.g., GEORGE DICKIE, ART AND THE AESTHETIC: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 33–
41 (outlining an institutional theory of art) (1974) [hereinafter DICKIE, ART AND THE AESTHETIC];
GEORGE DICKIE, THE ART CIRCLE, at viii (1984) (reworking the institutional theory of art advanced
in previous works); George Dickie, A Tale of Two Artworlds, in DANTO AND HIS CRITICS 111, 111 (Mark
Rollins ed., 2d ed. 2012) (defending his “version of the institutional theory of art”); George Dickie,
Defining Art, 6 AM. PHIL. Q. 253, 256 (1969) (“It all depends on the institutional setting.”); see also
Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 424–25 (describing a Nebraska obscenity case in which the
court employed what it mislabeled a “Dickey analysis,” asking whether the work in question had been
exhibited in a “serious venue”).
273. DICKIE, ART AND THE AESTHETIC, supra note 272, at 29, 33–34.
274. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“The Constitution cannot control such
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”).
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mediums. 275 Painters and art historians, composers, instrumentalists, and
musicologists—all are authorities on their respective mediums. They are people
we might turn to when deciding whether hard cases count as a painting, say, or
music. Here is where something like the Institutional Theory has some appeal.
Those working in and on each medium of expression might have useful things
to say about what falls within it and what does not. But that is different from
saying that something is a painting because “the Artworld” says so 276—or that
something called “the Artworld,” rather than medium-specific communities of
expertise, exists at all.
Second, we might turn from procedural theories to substantive ones and
seek some essential feature that all artworks share. One leading example comes
from Danto, whose philosophical account describes artworks as “embodied
meanings.” 277 This is to say, first, that artworks—unlike mere things—are about
something. 278 But more than this, they embody that which they are about: (some
of) their material properties are themselves part of the meaning. 279 Artworks
show, or exemplify, 280 what they are about. 281
Unlike the Institutional Theory, Danto’s essentialist account of art at least
points to something—meaning—that is relevant to the First Amendment, and
that artworks are all said to share. But to say that artworks are about something
is, in itself, to make them no different from any other form of expression. For
proponents of art exemptions, the question has to be: How is art special in
comparison to other things that bear meaning?
This is where Danto’s embodiment criterion comes in. Artworks
exemplify their meaning; their material properties express something about
their message. And sure enough, this point is made in any number of the
examples canvased in Part I. The art vendors in New York City claimed that
the selling of their works on the streets was itself a crucial part of the works’
meaning; the junked car artist in Texas alleged content discrimination, arguing
that the junked car medium exemplified the work’s message about car culture
and the environment. The appeal of Danto’s theory in the art exemption
context, thus, is clear: if something is art, then—according to the theory—

275. Supra Section II.B.
276. To presage the theory of Danto quickly to come: “according the status of art” to something is
“less a matter of declaration than of discovery.” ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART:
CONTEMPORARY ART AND THE PALE OF HISTORY 195 (1997).
277. See, e.g., DANTO, WHAT ART IS, supra note 73, at 37.
278. Id. at 37.
279. Id.
280. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing exemplification).
281. Put another way, unlike other meaning-bearing things, for a work of art “there [must] be an
interpretation through which we can see that its meaning something explains why it has the form it
has.” Arthur C. Danto, Intellectual Autobiography, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARTHUR C. DANTO 46
(Randall E. Auxier & Lewis Edwin Hahn eds., 2013).
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regulating the material nature of the work is often to regulate its meaning,
thereby giving rise to First Amendment worries.
Putting philosophy aside, the legal difficulty here is one that has been
mentioned already: exemplified meaning is a particular challenge for Free
Speech law. 282 Nothing expresses hostility more than a punch in the face. But
surely most of the expressive conduct that exemplifies hostility cannot be seen
as speech; the First Amendment is no defense to a charge of aggravated assault.
Since, as Danto believes, anything can be art (which is not to say that everything
is art), 283 art exemptions could be invoked on behalf of anything. Danto’s theory
of art does not provide a useful limiting principle when legal conflicts arise,
particularly over the ways in which art’s meaning is embodied.
Third and finally, theories of art that emphasize aesthetic experience might
seem able to cabin the expansiveness of Danto’s theory of art, since not
everything seems like a promising source of aesthetic enjoyment. 284 Here we
can look to Monroe Beardsley’s aesthetic definition: “An artwork is something
produced with the intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic
interest.” 285 Beardsley cashes out “aesthetic interest” in terms of the quest to
have an aesthetic experience, in which we attend to an object’s perceptual
features and formal design while bracketing out our own practical interests or
outside concerns. 286 Beardsley’s notion of aesthetic experience descends from a
long tradition in philosophical aesthetics in which thinkers dating back to
Immanuel Kant and Francis Hutcheson in the eighteenth century have tied the
aesthetic to disinterested contemplation—a stance in which we insulate
aesthetic judgment from moral, political, or practical judgments about how a
work might make the world better or promote our own personal interests. 287
Aesthetic theories of art have a deep hold on the law. I have described
elsewhere U.S. law’s penchant for distinguishing beauty from utility, whether
in tariff, copyright, or patent law. 288 The strictness with which the law excludes
282. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
283. See DANTO, WHAT ART IS, supra note 73, at 26.
284. Cf. Ted Cohen, The Possibility of Art: Remarks on a Proposal by Dickie, 82 PHIL. REV. 69, 78
(1973) (rejecting as candidates for aesthetic appreciation “ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes,
[and] the plastic forks given at some drive-in restaurants”).
285. Monroe C. Beardsley, An Aesthetic Definition of Art, in AESTHETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF ART—THE ANALYTIC TRADITION: AN ANTHOLOGY 58 (Peter Lamarque & Stein Haugom Olsen
eds., 2004).
286. See id.; see also Monroe C. Beardsley, The Aesthetic Point of View, 1 METAPHILOSOPHY 39, 46
(1970) (defining “aesthetic gratification” as pleasure taken in, or enjoyment of, the particular formal
and regional properties of an artwork).
287. See generally THOMAS HILGERS, AESTHETIC DISINTERESTEDNESS: ART, EXPERIENCE,
AND THE SELF (2016) (building off Kant and his empiricist predecessors to develop a disinterested
theory of art); Alexandra King, The Aesthetic Attitude, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2019),
https://www.iep.utm.edu/aesth-at/ [https://perma.cc/5263-RLM7] (defining the aesthetic attitude and
providing its history).
288. See Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 407–12, 437–42.
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objects capable of any practical use from benefits like reduced tariffs 289 is surely
a reaction to the fact that we can take a disinterested aesthetic stance to any
number of things that the law has good reason for regulating. A benefit or
exemption intended for art could easily be extended to tools, furniture,
appliances or many other things if the relevant test was merely, “Can this object
spark an aesthetic experience?” After all, we can take different stances on an
object at different times. And this is a problem for anyone wanting to base
constitutional art exemptions on an aesthetic theory of art. Beardsley’s aesthetic
theory might not be as capacious as Danto’s embodiment theory—surely there
are some things, after all, that are just too disgusting or banal to prompt
aesthetic experiences. But as camp, 290 everyday aesthetics, 291 and pop art 292
show, people can derive aesthetic experiences from things far outside the
bounds of traditional mediums of expression: perhaps even terrorist acts, as the
especially controversial example of composer Karlheinz Stockhausen
suggests. 293
That said, the aesthetic theory of art does have an especially crucial lesson
to teach about traditional mediums of expression. Some mediums have become
traditional precisely because they are so well suited for providing aesthetic
experiences. Some may only be suited for that purpose. There is just not much
else you can do with an opera, symphony, ballet, or novel but enjoy its aesthetic
qualities. Contrast these with, say, a beautiful car, chair, or teapot, which can be
appreciated either as an aesthetic object or as a tool for transporting, sitting, or
steeping. Certain traditional mediums of expression are uniquely efficient at
delivering aesthetic experiences and for doing so without remainder—in other
words, without doing anything else. Since the law ordinarily has no business
regulating aesthetic experience itself, works in these mediums leave the law with
little that it might legitimately regulate.
It makes sense, then, that the Supreme Court should regard these
mediums as “unquestionably shielded.” 294 What does not make sense, though,
is to expand this shield by unthinkingly extrapolating from these traditional
mediums of expression, which so efficiently and exclusively provoke aesthetic
experiences, to the much wider set of things capable of provoking aesthetic
experiences. The wedding cakes at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop show this
289. See id. at 407–10.
290. See Susan Sontag, Notes on ‘Camp’, 31 PARTISAN REV. 515, 515 (1964).
291. See YURIKO SAITO, EVERYDAY AESTHETICS 54 (2007).
292. See Marshall W. Fishwick, Pop Art and Pop Culture, 3 J. POPULAR CULTURE 23, 23–24 (1969).
293. See Anthony Tommasini, Music, The Devil Made Him Do It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/30/arts/music-the-devil-made-him-do-it.html
[https://perma.cc/7WPC-UDQ9] (describing Stockhausen’s comments characterizing the 9/11 attacks
as “the greatest work of art that is possible in the whole cosmos”).
294. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(referring to abstract painting, instrumental music, and nonsense poetry).
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extrapolation in action. 295 Phillips’s cakes are gorgeous; they can provide
aesthetic pleasure in abundance. But cakes do much more than that, and like
anything else meant for ingestion, they are ripe for legal regulation to an extent
that novels and symphonies should never be.
Like the other theories, aesthetic theories of art say something important
about why we might be tempted to offer art exemptions: mediums of expression
that have evolved solely to provide aesthetic experiences and nothing else are
unlikely subjects for legitimate legal regulation. But lots of things can prompt
aesthetic experiences. Using aesthetics as a criterion for legal exemptions
without limiting them to specific mediums of expression, or without varying
the exemptions medium by medium, would force the law to take a disinterested
stance toward things that should legitimately interest it. Mediums like
photography, with its (sometimes) real human subjects; architecture, with its
intrusions on the lived and natural environment; marches, with their potential
to hurt, disrupt, or exclude 296 —these mediums offer aesthetic experiences
entwined with nonaesthetic and legally salient effects and injuries. Aesthetic
experiences provided by expressive objects or events that do not employ
traditional mediums of expression—think hunger strikes, riots, or, again,
terrorist attacks—are even more problematic from the law’s perspective. An
aesthetic theory of art, used as the basis for artistic exemption claims, would
flatten these distinctions. By contrast, focusing on mediums of expression
brings the varied costs of exemptions to the foreground.
*

*

*

The normative argument made in this part has three steps. First, it
expresses skepticism about the possibility of finding a trait shared by all
artworks, especially one that would support artistic exemptions in law. Second,
it highlights reasons to be more optimistic about defining mediums of
expression, given their more limited reach compared to “art” and the fact that
many of them have spawned rich practical and scholarly bodies of knowledge.
Finally, since the materiality that distinguishes mediums of expression is likely
the very thing the law has business regulating, individuating mediums of
expression allows us to evaluate different mediums differently for exemption
purposes, instead of lumping them indiscriminately together under a catchall
category like art. Constitutional law thus should jettison the concept of art in
favor of its traditional emphasis on mediums of expression, whether artistic or
not.

295. See supra Section I.B.3.
296. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581 (allowing the exclusion of gay, lesbian, and bisexual marchers in a
St. Patrick’s Day parade).
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The following part argues that Supreme Court doctrine largely already
does jettison the concept of art—and that important recent and pending cases
would be simpler if advocates and scholars would do so too. Section III.A
describes the Supreme Court’s surprisingly underrecognized focus on mediums
of expression. Section III.B then returns to some of the case studies above to
show how discarding talk of art would improve future disputes over legal
exemption claims made on art’s behalf.
III. LAW WITHOUT “ART”
A.

Supreme Court Doctrine

The claim that the concept of art is constitutionally irrelevant is less
revisionary than it sounds. To be sure, advocates constantly argue for art’s
special constitutional status. That is the basis of the artistic exemption claims
made throughout the law, as detailed in Part I. Similarly, scholars working to
justify First Amendment coverage for art often assume that art is the category
in need of justification. 297 But look a bit deeper, and even some of these
scholarly accounts of constitutional coverage of art devolve into discussions of
particular mediums of expression. 298 To take one prominent contemporary
example: while Mark Tushnet has at times written of art and artistic expression
in general when talking about the First Amendment, 299 his recent book on the
subject, written with Alan Chen and Joseph Blocher, is careful to focus on
specific mediums of expression or even subsets of those mediums—

297. See, e.g., RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 280 (2009) (“How can
art be defined and distinguished from the forms of ‘art’ that already are protected because they fit the
free speech paradigm?”); Hamilton, supra note 23, at 109 (offering a theory for why “nonrational,
nondiscursive elements of art are important to the republican democratic enterprise”); Robert Post,
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 486 (2011) [hereinafter Post, Participatory
Democracy] (“Art and other forms of no[n]cognitive, nonpolitical speech fit comfortably within the
scope of public discourse.”); Post, Participatory Democracy, supra, at 620 (“[I] consider art as deserving
constitutional protection because of its connection to public opinion formation in a democracy.”); id.
at 621 (“So long as Brokeback Mountain, and indeed all forms of communication that sociologically we
recognize as art, form part of the process by which society ponders what it believes and thinks, it is
protected under a theory of the First Amendment that stresses democratic participation.”).
298. Just after claiming that art fits “comfortably within the scope of public discourse,” for example,
Post goes on to specify that “First Amendment doctrine typically regards communication within
recognized media as presumptively within public discourse and hence within the scope of the First
Amendment.” Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 297, at 486; see also Post, Recuperating, supra note
193, at 1253–56 (discussing Warhol’s film Sleep and Duchamp’s Fountain as members of “recognized
medium[s] for the communication of ideas”). Similarly, Sheldon Nahmod’s account of “artistic
expression” and the First Amendment clarifies in an early footnote that “[w]hile this Article deals
primarily with the visual arts of painting and sculpture, much of the analysis is applicable to
architecture, music and literature.” Nahmod, supra note 23, at 222 n.2.
299. See MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION § 3.2
(2018) (“[F]ew scholars of freedom of expression doubt that artistic expression is covered.”).
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instrumental music, nonrepresentational visual art, and nonsense poetry (and
other text). 300
1. Mediums in Supreme Court Doctrine
These free speech scholars who focus on mediums are faithful to the
Supreme Court’s own approach in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 301 which unanimously affirmed that “the Constitution
looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression” and must
cover more than expression with a “narrow, succinctly articulable message.”
Were it otherwise, the First Amendment “would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” 302 Painting, music, and
poetry are protected, the Court said in Hurley, even if it is nonrepresentational
or nonsensical. 303 But that is because those works are members of recognized
and protected mediums of expression—not because they are works of art. 304
By contrast, Professor Tushnet thinks that “the fact that something is
denominated ‘art’ changes the constitutional landscape dramatically,” 305 and he
wonders why that should be so for nonrepresentational art. 306 Here, he and I
part ways. For me, the relevant question is not “Why do we protect
nonrepresentational painting or instrumental music?,” but rather “Why do we
deem painting and music to be traditional mediums of expression?” For the way
the Supreme Court’s free speech doctrine has proceeded is by identifying a
given medium of expression as protected and then applying coverage 307 to all
works within that medium, whether representational or not. 308
As such, the Supreme Court at first didn’t extend First Amendment
coverage to movies, lumping them not with the press but instead with theater,

300. See generally TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23.
301. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
302. Id. 569.
303. Id.
304. TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23, at 143. As Joseph Blocher argues, “Jabberwocky
is covered by the First Amendment not because its words represent concepts but because it is
recognizable as a poem.” Id.
305. Id. at 103.
306. See id. at 70.
307. To apply coverage is not necessarily to apply protection. See Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1765, 1769 (2004) (distinguishing material that the First Amendment applies to (covered material) from
that covered material which the government is prohibited from regulating in a particular way (protected
material)).
308. See Post, Recuperating, supra note 193, at 1253 (“[The Supreme Court] assumed that if a
medium were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment, each instance of the medium would
also be protected; courts need not and perhaps should not ask whether any particular film succeeded in
communicating its specific message.”).
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circuses, pantomime, and other “shows and spectacles.” 309 It wasn’t until 1952
that the Supreme Court formally changed course, admitting that “motion
pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas.” 310 But
importantly, in the same case, the Court noted that although basic First
Amendment principles remain constant, that doesn’t mean that “motion
pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other
particular method of expression. Each method,” the Court said, “tends to
present its own peculiar problems.” 311
Time after time, the Supreme Court or its individual Justices have heeded
this caution and treated mediums of expression separately rather than lumping
them together under terms like art or the arts. Public speechmaking, radio,
books, magazines, newspapers, television, 312 the mail, 313 posters, signs, and
billboards, 314 marches or parades, 315 leaflets and sound trucks, 316 picketing, 317
and internet websites 318—the Court has recognized all of these mediums over
the years, along with “pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings, . . .
oral utterance and the printed word.” 319 The Court recently added another
recognized medium, video games, although Justice Scalia’s analysis in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n 320 was fairly cursory:
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video
games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many
familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music)
and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s
interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First
Amendment protection. 321
It is worth reiterating that the Court’s argument is not that video games are
artworks and therefore protected. Rather, video games comprise a medium of
expression, the techniques and material resources of which are sufficiently
309. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915), overruled by Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); see also John Wertheimer, Mutual Film Reviewed: The
Movies, Censorship, and Free Speech in Progressive America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 158, 160 (1993).
310. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
311. Id. at 503 (equating “media of communications of ideas” with “methods of expression”).
312. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 51 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
313. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 137–38 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
314. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opinion); id. at
524 (Brennan, J., concurring).
315. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995).
316. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977).
317. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988).
318. United States v. Am. Lib. Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 227–28 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973).
320. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
321. Id. at 790.
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analogous to those of other previously recognized mediums of expression for
coverage to be merited here as well. 322
Though the bare majority that decided Brown ignored the point, one
dissenting Justice and two who concurred in the judgment emphasized how—
in the Court’s previous words—“each medium of expression presents special
First Amendment problems.” 323 Justice Breyer worried in Brown about the
unique combination of expression with physical action often present in video
games; 324 meanwhile, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, was struck
by the uniquely realistic, immersive, and interactive worlds video games
typically offer. 325 “When all of the characteristics of video games are taken into
account,” Justice Alito wrote, “there is certainly a reasonable basis for thinking
that the experience of playing a video game may be quite different from the
experience of reading a book, listening to a radio broadcast, or viewing a
movie.” 326
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Breyer were reflecting the
Court’s longstanding notion that “[e]ach method of communicating ideas is ‘a
law unto itself’ and that law must reflect the ‘differing natures, values, abuses
and dangers’ of each method.” 327 As technology and society have changed and
new mediums of expression have come before the Court, “[t]he uniqueness of
each medium of expression has been a frequent refrain.” 328
Art itself is not a medium of expression. Providing blanket coverage across
all artworks would prevent the Court from attending to the unique challenges
presented by the various mediums of expression, whether artistic, non-artistic,
or mixed.

322. Id.
323. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
324. Brown, 564 U.S. at 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 820 (Alito, J., concurring).
326. Id.
327. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)).
328. Id. at 501 n.8; see also id. at 557–58 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“As all those joining in today’s
disposition necessarily recognize, ‘[e]ach medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.’ The uniqueness
of the medium, the availability of alternative means of communication, and the public interest the
regulation serves are important factors to be weighed; and the balance very well may shift when
attention is turned from one medium to another.” (citations omitted) (first quoting id. at 501 n.8
(plurality opinion)); and then quoting id. at 527 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment))). But see
Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech, the radio, the
stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between the various
methods of communicating ideas.”).
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2. Counterarguments
Arguing against this doctrinal point, Professor Tushnet offers two strong
counterexamples that, he thinks, demonstrate the Supreme Court’s belief that
all art is “presumptively covered by the First Amendment”: National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley 329 and obscenity law. 330
Take Finley first, a challenge to the moralistic criteria the National
Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) began using in awarding grants starting in
1990. 331 Congress had dictated that arts grants be based not just on “artistic
merit” standing alone but also “taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public.” 332 Performance artists who had been denied grants brought suit,
claiming that the decency requirement constituted viewpoint discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment. 333
Tushnet’s argument is that no one would think of bringing a First
Amendment challenge to most selective government subsidies outside the arts
context—to defense contracts or support for farmers, for example. 334 The fact
that the parties and courts involved in Finley all unthinkingly applied the First
Amendment shows, according to Tushnet, that “art” is a constitutionally
relevant concept—a First Amendment trigger. 335
To forestall this conclusion, we might say that as long as the plaintiffs
themselves were artists working in a particular medium of expression, the
Supreme Court never needed to reach the question, or make the assumption,
that all art is covered. But since the plaintiffs in Finley were raising a facial
challenge to the NEA’s criteria across the board, 336 I think a better response is
to look to what it is the NEA actually endows.
The NEA’s enabling legislation defines “the arts” to include:
music (instrumental and vocal), dance, drama, folk art, creative writing,
architecture and allied fields, painting, sculpture, photography, graphic
and craft arts, industrial design, costume and fashion design, motion
pictures, television, radio, film, video, tape and sound recording, the arts
related to the presentation, performance, execution, and exhibition of

329. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
330. TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23, at 102–03.
331. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572–73 (1998).
332. Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)).
333. Id. at 577.
334. See TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23, at 103. To be clear, these examples are
mine, not Tushnet’s.
335. Id.
336. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 580.
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such major art forms, [and] all those traditional arts practiced by the
diverse peoples of this country. 337
This is a list of mediums of expression. Art as an umbrella term is nowhere to
be found. In place of a theory of art, or even a theory of the arts, 338 federal law
enumerates a list of mediums. Were the NEA to give money to, say, non-artistic
sound recordings or television shows, its decency requirement would be subject
to the same challenge under the First Amendment because a traditional medium
of expression would still be affected. Arthood is not the necessary trigger.
Turning to Tushnet’s second objection: he says the Court’s obscenity cases
have “simply assumed that material that can be described as sufficiently artistic
cannot be obscene.” 339 In fact, the current test for obscenity, from the 1973 case
Miller v. California, 340 does say that works can be obscene only if they lack
“serious . . . artistic . . . value.” 341 This would seem to be a clear art exemption,
compelled by the First Amendment and, thus, a strong counterexample to my
thesis that art is constitutionally irrelevant.
Yet things look a bit different once we fill in the ellipses in the quotation
from Miller. Obscenity, the Miller Court held, must be limited to works that,
“taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.” 342 It’s tautological, of course, that only artworks can have artistic value.
But the inclusion of literary value alongside artistic value suggests that “artistic”
is being used not as a catchall concept, but in a more medium-specific way,
referring to quality in the visual arts. A painting, print, drawing, movie, or
photograph with artistic value, just like a piece of writing with literary value,
cannot be criminalized as obscene. 343 Since obscenity is a concept largely
confined to a few specific mediums of expression—basically, prose and
pictures 344 —talk of literary and artistic value is really tied more to specific
mediums of expression than to any notion of art in general. This is an example
of art’s dual meaning: the broader, umbrella concept that has been invoked
throughout this Article, and the narrower, “art gallery” sense, where “art” just
refers to visual mediums. The fact that the Miller test references the narrow,

337. 20 U.S.C. § 952(b).
338. For the distinction between a theory of art, a theory of the arts, and theories of arts, see supra
notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
339. TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23, at 102.
340. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
341. Id. at 24.
342. Id. (emphasis added).
343. For more on how this standard is applied, see Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at
419–26. For a great descriptive account that disrupts the widespread view that obscenity prosecutions
no longer happen, see generally Jennifer M. Kinsley, The Myth of Obsolete Obscenity, 33 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 607 (2015).
344. See Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 26 (2007).
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medium-focused sense of artistic does not show that the broad concept used in
artistic exemption claims has constitutional significance.
That’s one potential response. A second goes the other direction and notes
that, by including artistic value alongside not only literary value, but political
and scientific value, too, the Miller test can really be rephrased or understood as
referring to anything that has value beyond its ability to provoke sexual arousal.
This is how Frederick Schauer, for example, famously analyzed obscenity: as a
“sexual surrogate” that “takes pictorial or linguistic form only because some
individuals achieve sexual gratification by those means.” 345 On Schauer’s
account, what the Supreme Court has actually done 346 in its obscenity cases is
to isolate “material devoid of intellectually communicative content”—“to
separate speech from non-speech.” 347 Here the point is not to decide whether
some book or picture is art but whether it communicates rather than merely
titillates.
On either of these two readings, art as an umbrella concept does no work
even in the one area of free speech law that would seem explicitly to invoke
it. 348
3. Application in the Lower Courts
The Supreme Court has, with the possible exception of obscenity,
resolutely focused on individual mediums of expression rather than the concept
of art. But lower courts have not always been so fastidious. 349 Part I’s examples
of appellate decisions on junked cars, privacy, and trademark illustrate the
point.

345. Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922 (1979).
346. See id. at 900 (“In order fully to understand the Court’s approach to obscenity, it is necessary
to ignore much of what the Court has said about its approach, and look instead at what it has done.”).
347. Id. at 930.
348. For those unsatisfied by these rebuttals, I would only add that if the doctrinal mess that is
obscenity law is the one place where the concept of art remains constitutionally relevant, that’s not
much of a score for my opponents. See, e.g., Kinsley, supra note 343, at 609 (“To a person, First
Amendment scholars have argued of late that obscenity law is obsolete, outdated, unused, and therefore
has little ongoing impact on the status of free expression in this country.”); Andrew Koppelman, Does
Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2005) (“[T]he doctrine is unworkable
and should be abandoned.”). Those unmoved by my responses above can simply treat obscenity as one
place where my thesis about art’s irrelevance is a revisionary call for change rather than a description
of current doctrine.
349. See, e.g., Disc. Inn, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 803 F.3d 317, 326 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.)
(“We must be careful not to impose a minimal standard of ‘expressiveness’ for determining when an
object is art and therefore protected by the First Amendment from government prohibition or destruction.”
(emphasis added)); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001) (“[T]he
United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a work of art is protected by the First Amendment
even if it conveys no discernable message . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Recall that in Kleinman, the junked car case, the Fifth Circuit treated
Hurley’s Jabberwocky passage as “refer[ring] solely to great works of art.” 350 The
Supreme Court, it said, has never “elaborated on the extent of First
Amendment protection for visual non-speech objects or artworks.” 351 The Fifth
Circuit’s opinion is not entirely clear on this point, but it suggests that
masterpieces might merit a level of First Amendment protection that lesser
works do not deserve. 352 That cannot be the law. 353 At the very least, it
misunderstands how the Supreme Court has treated First Amendment
coverage: not by evaluating the quality of individual artworks, setting some line
above which coverage is granted, but instead by considering individual
mediums of expression. The problem with Kleinman’s junked car isn’t its
quality as an artwork. The problem is that junked cars, or junked car planters,
are not traditional mediums of expression.
The courts in Bery and Mastrovincenzo—the street vending cases—
understood this, at least on some level. In Bery, the Second Circuit refused to
distinguish the Supreme Court’s case law on film, theater, and instrumental
music from that about parades, marches, and sit-ins. 354 In describing the
expressive value of visual forms of communication, the Bery court mentioned
not just Winslow Homer, but non-art examples like the pictorial
representations in written languages such as Chinese and Nahuatl. 355 This is all
to say that the Second Circuit did not treat arthood as a necessary requirement
for First Amendment coverage. The mediums of expression it emphasized went
beyond those used solely or even primarily by artists.
The reason the Fifth Circuit cited the Second Circuit’s vendor cases in
Kleinman, however, was because both courts realized that arthood cannot be a
sufficient condition any more than it can be a necessary condition for First
Amendment coverage. 356 Both courts were grappling with the fact that
arguments of the form “x is an artwork, thus protected from regulation” are
untenable. 357 If anything can be art, anything can benefit from an art exemption.
By contrast, not anything can be a painting, photograph, print, or sculpture—
the mediums of expression protected in Bery. The Fifth Circuit may have
350. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2010).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 456–58 (arguing that the First Amendment is
least permissive of aesthetic judgment in law in cases where the removal or destruction of an artwork
is at stake).
354. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1994).
355. Id. at 695.
356. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 326–27.
357. Id. at 327; Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (“To say that
the First Amendment protects the sale or dissemination of all objects ranging from ‘totem poles’ . . .
to television sets does not take us far in trying to articulate or understand a jurisprudence of ordered
liberty; indeed, it would entirely drain the First Amendment of meaning.” (citation omitted)).
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misunderstood the medium-based distinction drawn by the Second Circuit, but
it certainly grasped the need for a distinction narrower than just “art.”
The jumble of tests employed in right of privacy/publicity and trademark
cases shows a similar move and confusion. 358 The allure of “x is art, thus
protected” arguments proves strong, as lower court decisions in the Arne
Svenson privacy case and the Ginger Rogers false advertising case both show. 359
But as Section I.B.1 described, the principal tests that have emerged in the
appellate courts look not to a work’s status as art, but to its transformative
nature, or to the extent to which someone’s name or likeness is related to the
meaning of the work. 360 These are tests that are neither limited to art nor
automatically satisfied by anything that counts as an artwork. 361
B.

Clarifying Future Cases

Although the concept of art does no work in the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment cases, advocates haven’t stopped relying on it when seeking
exemptions there. Far from it.
When the rap threat case, Knox, was before the Supreme Court on a
petition for certiorari, 362 the rapper was supported not just by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 363 but by “rap artists,” “music

358. See supra Section I.B.1; see also supra note 142 (describing the relation between privacy- and
publicity-related causes of action).
359. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 120–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Having determined that
the speech in question is artistic expression, whether there were alternate avenues open to Fellini to
convey his film’s message is not subject to examination by this court. Because the speech at issue here
is not primarily intended to serve a commercial purpose, the prohibitions of the Lanham Act do not
apply . . . .”), aff’d, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL
3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013) (“Art is considered free speech and is therefore protected
by the First Amendment.”).
360. See supra Section I.B.1; see also Post & Rothman, supra note 134, at 156–62 (describing various
tests courts have developed in attempting to distinguish public discourse from commodities in right of
publicity cases).
361. In fact, it is difficult to determine what role even mediums of expression play in right of
publicity cases. Post and Rothman claim that when people’s names or images “appear in a traditionally
recognized ‘medium for the communication of ideas,’ such as fine art, film, newspapers, radio, or books,
courts are comfortable classifying them as presumptively public discourse” and offering First
Amendment protection. Post & Rothman, supra note 134, at 159. But what happens when drawings or
paintings are employed “outside of traditional media, as for instance on t-shirts and coffee mugs”—or
chewable dog toys? Id. at 160; cf. VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175
(9th Cir. 2020) (finding that “the Bad Spaniels dog toy, although surely not the equivalent of the Mona
Lisa, is an expressive work”). I am grateful to Robert Post, Betsy Rosenblatt, and Felix Wu for helping
me see, though not solve, the difficulties in these cases.
362. See supra Section I.A.2.
363. Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae and Brief of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Commonwealth v. Knox,
190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18949).
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industry representatives,” and “leading rap music scholars,” 364 as well as the “art
scholars and historians” who, as described above, argued that “[a]rt does not
manifest in the real.” 365
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the brief for Phillips literally begins by
mentioning his “love for art and design” and his goal of creating “an art gallery
of cakes.” 366 It describes him as “an artist using cake as his canvas with
Masterpiece as his studio.” 367 And it claims that the First Amendment protects
Phillips from complying with Colorado public accommodation law “because his
wedding cakes . . . are his artistic expression.” 368 At oral argument, the bulk of
the time on Masterpiece Cakeshop’s side was spent distinguishing just who is
an artist: Florists? Jewelers? Invitation designers? Hair stylists? Chefs? Tailors?
Someone who does makeup? 369 As Justice Kagan joked, the latter is “called an
artist. It’s the makeup artist.” 370
Nearly all of this was a waste of time. As this final section aims to show,
cases that include artistic exemption claims—including some of the more
prominent ones that have and will soon come before the Supreme Court—
would appear quite different if the concept of art were never mentioned. This
is the payoff of this Article’s normative argument. We now can see that talk of
art in these cases is not just hopelessly vague or undefined; it affirmatively
misleads courts away from the real issues that are at stake. Three illustrations
of this follow.
1. Rapped Threats
371

Consider Knox first. The strong version of the art exemption claim
offered there argued that a threat made in rap cannot be criminalized, for rap is
art, and art is something set apart from everyday reality. In the words of the art
scholars and historians who filed a brief supporting Knox in the Supreme Court,
“A painting, poem, sculpture, or song may be consistent with reality, but that
does not mean that it is reality.” 372 For that reason, they asserted, “it has long

364. Knox, Brief of Render, supra note 88, at 1, 4.
365. Knox, Brief for Art Scholars, supra note 88, at 8.
366. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for Petitioners, supra note 207, at 1, 2017 WL 3913762, at *1.
367. Id.
368. Id. (emphasis added).
369. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–20, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111). The transcript notes seventeen uses of the word
“artist(s),” seven of “artistic,” six of “art,” seven of “artisan(s),” and three of “artistry.” Id. at 103.
370. Id. at 12.
371. For background, see supra Section I.A.2.
372. Knox, Brief for Art Scholars, supra note 88, at 8.
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been understood that expressions or depictions of violence in art are not
intended to bring about the violence they depict.” 373
The hyperbole characteristic of rap 374 may have seeped into the art
scholars’ brief. For their claim can’t literally be true. The very point of some
songs—think of “La Marseillaise,” 375 for example—is to bring about the bloody
resistance it describes. Historically, entire artistic movements have been built
around depicting and inspiring violence. 376 In the present day, the U.S. Army
creates video games not just for training but for recruitment—to find people
willing “to bring about the violence [the video games] depict.” 377
In none of these cases is the call to violence any less real because it is made
through a work of art. In fact, the artistic quality of the call might make it even
more inspiring—just think how the music of “La Marseillaise” causes bar
patrons to rise together in Casablanca’s most moving scene. 378
At the same time, plenty of statements that could be understood as threats
in some contexts clearly aren’t in other contexts—whether in songs or theatrical
performances, stand-up routines or games of make believe. A joke isn’t
somehow set apart from reality, as some said of art in Knox; it simply provides
a context in which we have (defeasible) reasons for not taking a statement
literally. Arthood is neither necessary nor sufficient for taking a statement out
of the realm of threats. The concept of art does no work in this.
Of course, as described above, the conventions of a given medium (say, of
theater) or genre (for example, rap) likely are relevant factors to consider in
determining whether someone working in that medium or genre is threatening.
373. Id.; see also id. at 12 (“[T]he fact that rap roots itself firmly in the real does not make it any
less representational (or any more real) than other forms of violent artistic expression that are entitled
to First Amendment protection.”).
374. See id. at 9 (“Rap also relies on hyperbole far more heavily than most other comparable forms
of expression.”).
375. What’s the Meaning of La Marseillaise?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-34843770 [https://perma.cc/68D3-RYJY].
376. According to the poet Filippo Tommaso Marinetti’s “Manifesto for Futurism,” which he
described as a “manifesto of ruinous and incendiary violence”: “We want to glorify war—the only cure
for the world—militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of the anarchists, the beautiful ideas
which kill, and contempt for woman.” Barbara Pozzo, Masculinity Italian Style, 13 NEV. L.J. 585, 598
n.106 (2013) (quoting F.T. MARINETTI, THE FUTURIST MANIFESTO (James Joll trans.)). See generally
THE VIOLENT MUSE: VIOLENCE AND THE ARTISTIC IMAGINATION IN EUROPE, 1910–39 (Jana
Howlett & Rod Mengham eds., 1994) (explicating “the close relationship between violence and
experimental art”).
377. Knox, Brief for Art Scholars, supra note 88, at 8. See generally Mike Thompson, More Than
Call of Duty – Killing in the Name of: The US Army and Video Games, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 1, 2019, 11:52
AM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2019/01/army-video-games/ [https://perma.cc/U2UX-7KFQ]
(explaining how the U.S. Army uses video games). Thanks to Darren Hudson Hick for this example.
378. See Madeleine Lebeau: The Face of La Marseillaise in Casablanca, IRISH TIMES,
https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/madeleine-lebeau-the-face-of-la-marseillaise-incasablanca-1.2657566 [https://perma.cc/FK3R-5HJ9] (May 23, 2016, 12:06 PM) (describing the
scene); CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
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Just as someone unfamiliar with traditional theatrical conventions might not
understand that the person on stage is playing a role, so too might those who
know little about rap fail to realize that the genre is “(in)famous for its
exaggerated, sometimes violent rhetoric.” 379 Understanding how hyperbole,
slang, and violence are standardly employed within a genre—whether rap or
reggae or country 380 —can determine whether we hear a lyric as a threat, a
confession, a clever rhyme, or fanciful role-play. Put more vividly, getting
“body-bagged” takes on a different meaning in a rap lyric than in a police
report. 381 Practitioners and scholars of the genre can play a crucial role in
educating courts and juries about the genre’s conventions, thereby helping them
understand the context that could be essential for determining meaning.
In Knox, some experts did exactly this. 382 But even as they did this
important work, they felt the need to insist that rap is “a form of artistic
expression” 383 —that Knox’s rap “is a work of poetry.” 384 Advocates clearly
worried that rap, arising from marginalized communities, would not be taken
seriously in court unless it were brought within the mantle of poetry, or better,
art. They wanted courts to accept that rap is art, and art cannot be criminalized
even when some find it threatening. 385
But this isn’t the right argument. Many rappers are undeniably artists;
whether Knox is among them doesn’t matter to his case. 386 What matters is that
Knox was working within a genre of song in which violent exaggeration is a
standard convention. This is a fact that has to be taken into account when
interpreting Knox’s rap lyrics. Genre conventions affect how words should

379. Knox, Brief of Render, supra note 88, at 19.
380. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 302 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 799
F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Presumably, [listeners] would [not] believe that Johnny Cash literally ‘shot
a man . . . just to watch him die.’ Nor would [listeners] likely conclude . . . that Bob Marley ‘shot the
sheriff’ but spared the deputy’s life.”); Commonwealth v. Gray, 978 N.E.2d 543, 561 (Mass. 2012)
(same); Andrea Dennis, Poetic (In)Justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and Criminal Evidence, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 15–16 (2007) (“[W]e accept that these artists [are] making purely artistic
statements.”).
381. See Amici Curiae Brief of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and Rap Music
Scholars (Professors Erik Nielson and Charis E. Kubrin) in Support of Petitioner at 10, Elonis v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2014) (No. 13-983) (“[I]n rap battles . . . it is common to use the term
‘body bag’ to describe an opponent’s victory over an adversary (e.g., ‘you just got body-bagged’).”).
382. See Knox, Brief of Render, supra note 88, at 19.
383. Id. at 2.
384. Id. at 19.
385. See, e.g., NIELSON & DENNIS, supra note 81, at 114 (“[I]t has become apparent that rapper
defendants are not considered legitimate artists and rap music does not merit the artistic recognition
granted to other forms of art. This perspective helps courts justify weaker First Amendment
protections.”).
386. Here is one difference between Knox, where I take the artistic status of rap to be indisputable,
and Masterpiece Cakeshop, where the artistic status of cakes is dubious—but similarly irrelevant, which is
the point.
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reasonably be heard. This, rather than rap’s artistic status, is what should make
a difference in determining whether any particular rap is truly threatening. 387
The impulse to insist on rap’s artistic status is understandable, even
necessary if you begin with the following assumptions: (1) that art is a protected
category in American constitutional law, given special status because of its
unique value; and (2) that the homogeneity of the judiciary makes it less likely
that judges will value art forms, like rap, that arise in communities other than
theirs. 388 The second assumption is surely correct. The first is not.
Given the limits of its experience, the judiciary likely needs experts’ help,
first, in identifying mediums of expression that are new—or new to many of
our judges. As I argued at the end of Part II, traditional mediums of expression
should be picked out and privileged not just because they are traditional.
(Traditional for whom?) Rather, certain mediums may have become traditional,
where they have, because they express so efficiently, with so little nonexpressive
remainder. 389 Experts can help courts identify new mediums in which this
occurs. Second, judges and juries may need help understanding the genre
conventions that shape what gets expressed in any given medium. This is the
work so necessary in the rap trials. Importantly, though, neither of these efforts
involves convincing judges that a certain expression deserves the honorific “art.”
2. Race-Based Casting
Medium matters in a different way when it comes to the exemptions from
antidiscrimination laws claimed by television shows, movies, and theatrical
productions. Examples of these include the case against The Bachelor franchise,
sued for casting White leads in its first two dozen seasons; the slippery slope
arguments made to the Supreme Court by cable operators warning about
imposing colorblind casting on the musical Hamilton; and, in fact, claims by the
cable operators themselves, who argued that they should be able to consider race
in developing their channel roster. 390
On my reading, Hamilton should have a First Amendment right to cast
minority actors as the Founding Fathers and The Bachelor should be able to
promote an antimiscegenationist message—at least if it is willing to admit that
as its aim. By contrast, a clothing store like Abercrombie & Fitch shouldn’t get
an exemption from Title VII’s prohibition on race and religious discrimination
in order to protect its “brand messaging,” even if that messaging involves a

387. To say this is not to deny the legal system’s failures in presenting judges and juries with the
contextual knowledge needed to understand the genre conventions of rap. For an extensive survey of
these failures, see generally NIELSON & DENNIS, supra note 18, at 101–20.
388. See Root et al., supra note 201 (discussing the demographics of the federal judiciary).
389. See supra p. 730.
390. See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text.
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multisensory, immersive, even theatrical in-store experience. 391 And the cable
operators before the Court last Term didn’t merit an exemption either. The
difference turns on the nature and, as importantly, the boundaries of traditional
mediums of expression.
To see why, return to Hurley, the Supreme Court’s deepest engagement
with expressive mediums and antidiscrimination law. In asking whether
Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade organizers could exclude a group of gay Irish
Americans, the Supreme Court focused on the inherently expressive nature of
parades: their expressiveness is the very thing that makes parades different than
ordinary walks. 392 To force the organizers to include certain marchers would be
to control the expressive content of their march. 393 It would force a change to the
organizers’ message no less than a law that dictated what elements a composer
could include in their score. 394
Notably, the unanimous Court in Hurley distinguished parades from cable
operators who, although covered under the First Amendment, 395 employ a
medium with much different conventions. Cable operators are generally seen
as conduits for the messaging of the individual channels that they offer for their
customers to flip through. 396 The cable network itself does not offer any
overarching, unified message—unlike parades, which tend to have a point. 397
Theater, like parades, is an inherently expressive medium. In fact, as
Section II.C described, theater is recognized as a traditional medium of
expression in part because it exists for little reason other than to express. 398 To
change the casting of Hamilton is to alter the very point or meaning of the show.
Hurley prohibits antidiscrimination law from compelling that kind of change.
To be sure, some implicit balancing is occurring here. A theatrical production’s
expressive interests would undoubtedly fail to trump laws against statutory rape
or cocaine use on stage, even if producers said that their show’s realism required
it. By contrast, statutory carve outs do exist in some places to exempt theaters
from laws like public smoking bans, at least when smoking is “an integral part
of the story.” 399

391. Abercrombie & Fitch’s “Look Policy” has been the subject of numerous lawsuits, including
an appearance-based religious accommodation claim that reached the Supreme Court. See Brief for
Respondent at 8, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015) (No. 14-86)
[hereinafter Abercrombie, Brief for Respondent].
392. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995).
393. See id. at 572–73.
394. See id. at 574–75.
395. Id. at 570.
396. Id. at 576.
397. Id. at 576–77.
398. See supra p. 730 (“There is just not much else you can do with an opera, symphony, ballet, or
novel but enjoy its aesthetic qualities.”).
399. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(e)(4) (2021).
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A brilliant comedy sketch shows why exemptions like these for traditional
mediums of expression require some rigorous boundary policing. An episode of
the Comedy Central show Nathan For You tried to help a dive bar skirt the
smoking ban in Pasadena by setting up a few audience seats on the side of the
room, thereby turning the entire space into a “boundary-pushing theatrical
experience” where the regular bargoers and staff were the unwitting performers,
suddenly allowed to smoke for the night. 400 “What’s the loophole?” someone
asks. “Theater law,” the show’s host answers. 401
The sketch turns art exemptions into comedy, but serious examples are
easy to imagine. Abercrombie & Fitch aims for an immersive, transporting,
sensory experience in its stores, but to achieve its desired look and feel, the
company has in the past engaged in race and religious discrimination. 402 Giving
Hamilton an exemption from Title VII’s prohibition on race discrimination
shouldn’t mean that Abercrombie & Fitch merits an exemption too, even if the
retailer stresses the “theatrical” nature of its in-store experience. Hamilton is
theater; Abercrombie & Fitch stores are not. Again, part of the reason
traditional mediums of expression have attained that status is because they do
so little but express. Even when that expression is for sale—Hamilton tickets do
not come cheap 403—people are paying for the expression; the expression is not
meant, as with Abercrombie, primarily to get them to buy clothing. 404
What is emerging here are a few guiding principles for granting
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws. First, traditional mediums of
expression should receive favored treatment when it comes to exemptions
because they are inherently expressive—in fact, many exist for little reason
other than to express.
Second, the boundaries of these mediums have to be fairly rigorously
policed. This will sound like anathema to many contemporary artists and media
studies scholars, and the conservatism of the approach is admittedly not one of
its more attractive features. But the point is to protect theater, not just anything
400. Kimberley Mcleod, “That Felt Real to Me”: When Reality Theatre and Reality Television Collide,
39 THEATRE RSCH. CANADA / RECHERCHES THÉÂTRALES AU CANADA 209, 218 (2018).
401. Joshua Alston, Nathan For You Finally Becomes Full-Blown Experimental Theater, AV CLUB
(Nov. 11, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://tv.avclub.com/nathan-for-you-finally-becomes-full-blownexperimental-1798185644 [https://perma.cc/3N2M-HH49].
402. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031, 2034 (2015); cf. EEOC
Agrees to Landmark Resolution of Discrimination Case Against Abercrombie & Fitch, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 18, 2004), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/11-18-04.cfm
[https://perma.cc/6357-W5AA] (“[I]ndustries need to know that businesses cannot discriminate against
individuals under the auspice of a marketing strategy or a particular ‘look.’”).
403. Amanda Harding, ‘Hamilton’ Tickets Are Still Ridiculously Expensive – But Why?, SHOWBIZ
CHEATSHEET (Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.cheatsheet.com/entertainment/hamilton-tickets-arestill-ridiculously-expensive-but-why.html/ [https://perma.cc/XZ27-KA55].
404. See Abercrombie, Brief for Respondent, supra note 391, at 7 (describing how Abercrombie &
Fitch uses its in-store experience in lieu of advertising).
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“theatrical.” As the previous point observed, the recognized mediums were
recognized in large part because they express so efficiently, with so little
remainder. Sculpture is recognized because, as traditionally practiced, its
materiality is generally safe, and its only intended purpose is to be looked at.
When junked cars or cakes are used instead of stone and marble, or when the
“sculpture” is meant to be eaten rather than simply viewed, the calculus changes.
Further, enforcement costs and incentives for pretextual exemption claims are
far less when someone stages a play in a theater or a show at a gallery than when
they label an event or thing in the outside world, especially the commercial
world, “performance art” or an “installation.” However unsatisfying boundary
policing of this sort will be, the real question is whether it is better than the
alternatives of either no exemptions or unbounded ones.
Finally, the whole point of exemptions is to protect the expressive
interests—the messaging or meaning-making—of the one seeking the
exemption. If expressive content is unlikely to be imputed to the one seeking
the exemption, or if elements of the expressive object can be changed without
greatly changing the overarching message, exemptions are not needed. This is
what the Supreme Court has said of the disparate collection of channels
provided by cable operators: changes in content won’t necessarily alter any
overarching message imputed to the operator, so a blanket First Amendment
defense is inappropriate. 405 Relatedly, if a speaker disclaims the very message
for which they seek First Amendment protection, there is little value served by
providing an exemption—even to a work within an otherwise shielded medium
of expression. The producers of The Bachelor should not be allowed to dodge a
race discrimination lawsuit by saying both that their show has no racial message
and that the First Amendment protects racist television shows. The latter is true
but, by The Bachelor’s own lights, irrelevant to its expressive interests—the very
thing the First Amendment is there to protect.
3. Wedding Vendors
We return at last to Masterpiece Cakeshop. To get First Amendment
protection from Colorado’s public accommodations laws, Phillips had three
options: try to fit his cakes into one of the traditional, recognized mediums of
expression; argue that cakes should be recognized as their own medium of
expression, much as movies and video games have been; 406 or skip past mediums
entirely and argue directly that his cakes should be protected because they are
works of art.
If this Article has done anything, it is to call this last strategy into question.
I have already described the problems with the baker’s attempted art exemption
405. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
406. See supra notes 307–22 and accompanying text.
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claim, 407 which has outlived his case. (Facing another discrimination claim,
Phillips asked in a recent newspaper editorial: “Can I just be a cake artist
again?”) 408
Assuming art’s constitutional irrelevance, Phillips is left needing either to
fit his cake making into one of the recognized mediums of expression or to
establish cakes as a medium of their own. Both suggestions were made in the
briefing. The “479 Creative Professionals” who supported Phillips argued that
“[i]n lieu of watercolors or pastels, Phillips uses fondant icing or frosting . . . .
The cake itself acts as his canvas and conveys his message.” 409 The Solicitor
General suggested that a wedding cake was “akin to a sculptural centerpiece.” 410
These kinds of argument raise the same worries Abercrombie & Fitch did
above: the store’s brand messaging might have been theatrical, but it was not
actually theater. Similarly, a cake’s surface might offer a “canvas,” its decoration
might be “painterly,” and its shape might be “sculptural,” but those are
metaphors, not classifications.
The most sustained effort to treat cakes as a medium of expression, not
just metaphorically akin to one, came from a richly illustrated amicus brief by a
dozen or so “cake artists” who wrote not in support of either party but of the
proposition that their work merits “as much protection as those who work in
other mediums.” 411 Acknowledging that cake making is not a “historically
established” medium, 412 amici described their cakes “as edible vehicles to convey
messages and emotions.” 413 More than mere bakers, cake artists
must have visual-arts skills to design a cake that is pleasing to the eye—
painting, drawing, and sculpting. They need the skills of an interior
designer to create a unified whole from a series of individually artistic
elements. They require the grace and technical powers of an architect, so
that the final product moves from the theoretical to the real. 414
Admirable in this argument is its attempt to analogically extend previously
recognized mediums, as we have seen the Supreme Court recently do with video
games. 415 What this argument lacks is consideration of whether cakes are
inherently expressive—like parades, songs, or handbills—or whether their
407. See supra Section I.B.3.
408. Phillips, supra note 22.
409. Brief of 479 Creative Professionals as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111).
410. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for the United States, supra note 218, at 24.
411. Brief for Cake Artists as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 31, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111).
412. Id. at 32.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 4–5.
415. See supra notes 320–22 and accompanying text (discussing Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786 (2011)).
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expressiveness is something variable, occasionally added on, or perhaps gained
through context or use. It may be relevant to consider, in the language of Part
II, how efficient cakes are as mediums for expressing ideas: Can they be said to
express without remainder, like poetry, which does almost nothing but express?
These questions are important because it is the “remainder”—the
nonexpressive aspect of cakes (the tasty, fattening, ingested parts)—that the law
is most likely and legitimately wanting to regulate. Insofar as those
nonexpressive aspects dominate, cakes become hard to distinguish from any
other product or service in the commercial wedding market. Rented tables too
can be celebratory when they are festooned with linens and decorations and
surrounded by wedding guests, but adding expressive elements or context to
tables does not make tables a medium of expression. Requiring the table rental
company to work with people of all races, religions, or sexual orientations affects
the tables’ use, not their meaning.
At this point it might help to recall some of what has already been argued:
•

•
•
•

•

Recognized mediums are inherently and often efficiently expressive,
and this is what makes First Amendment law generally more
solicitous of items within those mediums than it is of other kinds of
items or activities. 416
The conventions of a medium can help determine the expressive
content of items within that medium. 417
Laws forcing a change in that expressive content will have a hard
time surviving First Amendment scrutiny . . . 418
. . . unless they are laws that target a given medium’s distinctive
harms. Marches, but not novels, have a tendency to disrupt traffic;
compared to bad poetry, bad architecture can be both more
dangerous and harder to avoid. Size regulations will thus receive far
different scrutiny when applied to marches and buildings than to
books. 419
Finally, worries that generally applicable laws might force changes
to expressive content within a medium really amount to worries
about forced changes to someone’s expression. If—perhaps due to the

416. See Ely, supra note 183, at 1488 n.26 (“It is, therefore, the medium, not the message, that can
fairly be labeled untraditional and thus arguably not entitled to protection as strong as other media
would be accorded.”); cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 568 (1995).
417. See supra Sections I.A.2, III.B.1 (discussing how the medium and genre conventions of rap
may be essential for interpreting a potential threat).
418. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
419. See supra notes 309–22 (discussing the distinctive challenges posed by each medium of
expression).
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medium conventions just mentioned—the expression isn’t likely to
be attributed to that someone, the worry disappears. 420
These principles focus our attention on particular aspects of what are
admittedly still difficult cases, whether they be about cakes, limo drivers,
caterers, florists, calligraphers, or photographers. 421 The fact that some wedding
vendors are operating within a recognized medium of expression may well
matter, as Carpenter and Volokh have argued. 422 But if so, this is because works
within such mediums tend to be inherently meaningful, and accommodation
laws could potentially force a change in that meaning—which is to say, in the
expressive content attributable to the work’s creator. Whether it actually does
or not, however, requires us to consider medium conventions both to determine
which elements of works in that medium are typically seen as meaningful and
to decide whether that meaning typically gets attributed to the author. Laws
that require new or customized expressive content will likely be most
vulnerable, 423 though even there, questions remain about whether the
expressive content is tied to the maker, or whether the maker is simply seen as
facilitating the expression of others. 424
As the Court said in Masterpiece Cakeshop, “The free speech aspect of
th[ese] case[s] is difficult.” 425 The difficulty hasn’t gone away. The principles
above don’t change the fact that these are complicated, fact-intensive decisions.
Courts, advocates, and scholars just need to realize that the decisions and the
difficulties have nothing to do with determining whether a cake, or anything
else, is a work of art.
CONCLUSION
It has long been thought obvious that if something is art, it must be
covered by the First Amendment. This Article has aimed to show just how
widespread that belief is and how sweeping its implications can be. The reach
of privacy, trademark, and tax laws; the ability to turn away LGBTQ couples
from your business or take race into account in your hiring; the regulation of
street vending and land use; the criminalization of threatening language—all of
these turn in part on the success of artistic exemption claims. It surely matters,
then, whether the conventional wisdom is correct: whether art really is a
category of things and activities the U.S. Constitution specially protects.
420. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
421. See supra note 215 (collecting cases).
422. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Carpenter/Volokh Brief, supra note 219, at 4 (distinguishing
photographers from bakers and florists).
423. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief of Abrams et al., supra note 222, at 6 (distinguishing customdesigned goods from premade ones).
424. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief of Wolff, supra note 225, at 15.
425. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
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The conventional wisdom about art and the Constitution is wrong. This
is the second thing this Article has aimed to show. To be sure, lots of artworks
are covered under the First Amendment but not because of their arthood. Art is
not, and should not be, a constitutionally relevant concept.
The problem with the conventional wisdom is not just that the concept of
art lacks defined, judicially administrable boundaries—though it does. Worse is
the fact that the various objects and activities that (arguably) fall within those
boundaries lack any common, defining trait that would suggest why those things,
rather than others, deserve exemptions from otherwise applicable laws.
Rather than asking whether something is art, the Supreme Court has long
emphasized mediums of expression instead. Use of a recognized medium
triggers more robust balancing of the medium’s expressive value against the
government’s interest in regulation. Because mediums of expression are
differentiated in large part by their materiality—the very thing the government
is most likely and legitimately wanting to regulate—focusing on them allows
courts to vary their scrutiny based on the varied nonexpressive dangers each
medium poses. Shifting attention from art to mediums of expression thus
foregrounds a set of concepts that are better cabined and more relevant to the
law’s concerns than the concept of art.
Mediums of expression remain surprisingly underdiscussed, however,
both in scholarship and in the courts. The assumption that arthood matters to
the Constitution seems to have occluded any sustained examination of the
concepts that are doing so much of the real constitutional work. Questions
remain about how mediums should be defined, which should be recognized, and
in what ways “each may present its own problems” for the law. 426 We need more
clarity about how mediums should be individuated, when new mediums deserve
to be recognized, and what biases—whether based on race, gender, geography,
class or just the inertia of tradition—might keep the law from recognizing
expressive mediums already in use. This Article provokes those questions more
than it has settled them. But to better understand mediums of expression and
the legal exemptions they might sometimes merit, the law first needs to move
beyond the concept of art. We need to see “art” as the constitutional irrelevance
that it is.

426. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
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